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UNIONS AND THE SOUTHERN COURTS:
PART I-BOYCOTTS IN THE SOUTHERN
COURTSt
SYLVESTER PETROtt
It has been claimed that unions have not flourished in the South
because of institutional barriers, including judicial antiunionism. Pro-
fessor Petro evaluates these charges in light of the common-law cases.
In this first installment, Professor Petro surveys the southern common-
law cases dealing with boycotts and contrasts them with comparable
decisions of the northern courts. He concludes that there was virtually
no dfference in the substantive law applied to labor disputes in the
South and in the North, and that the southern courts often followed the
'"iberal"prounion view of the New York courts.
In the next installment of this study Professor Petro examines the
equity procedures and practices of the southern courts and the way in
which.they dealt with union and employer violence in labor disputes.
Thereafter, in afinal,4rticle Professor Petro broadens the perspective to
evaluate the southern cases in light of the common-law developments in
the fields of conspiracy and tort that took place over five centuries or
more in the United States and Great Britain.
This essay attempts to evaluate the beliefs that unions have not done as
well as they should have in the South and that the reason for this supposedly
poor performance has lain in "institutional barriers," presumably legal barri-
ers among others.' Similar beliefs expressed over the years about the perform-
: This is the first of three installments. Part II appears later in this volume. The final
installment will appear as a separate article in volume 60.
#f Member of the Illinois Bar. A.B., 1943, J.D. 1945, University of Chicago; LL M. 1950,
University of Michigan. Director, The Institute for Law and Policy Analysis, Winston-Salem,
N. C.; formerly professor of law at various universities. Author, The Labor Policy of the Free
Society (1957) and of other books and articles.
1. By the "South" we mean the II confederate states. The literature on unions and the
South is extremely large, and no attempt will be made here to cover it. For a guide to much of it,
see the articles in ESSAYS IN SOUTHERN LABOR HISTORY (G. Fink & M. Reed eds. 1977), espe-
cially the article by Nolan & Jonas, Textile Unionism in the Piedmont, 1901-1932. The authors
take the position that at least some of the organizational failures of unions in the South trace more
to union ineptitude than to the "institutional barriers," id. at 48, that writers have referred to so
often. One such writer is F. Ray Marshall who, in his LABOR IN THE SOUTH (1967), frequently,
but always vaguely, referred to the "hostile environment." Id. at ix. See generally Marshall,
Foreword, this symposium. One of the best books I have read about workers in the South after
the Civil War is C. SPAHR, AMERICA'S WORKING PEOPLE (1900). While strongly proworking-man
and even prounion (not always the same thing), Spahr gives an even-handed account of labor,
race, and union issues in the South. See, e.g., id. at 118-19. For a less even-handed account, see
T. TIPPETT, WHEN SOUTHERN LABOR STIRS (1931), a book in which some semblance of fairness is
achieved by reproducing in an appendix an address by Mr. Bernard Cone, president of the Prox-
imity Cotton Mills, Greensboro, N.C., defending the labor policies and practices of the North
Carolina textile firms and arguing powerfully against any need or use for unions. Id. at 297-333.
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ance of unions and the legal system generally in the United States have been
of great interest to me.2 Hence, when invited to participate in this symposium,
I requested that I be allowed to evaluate the labor law decisions of the south-
ern courts in light of what was going on in the northern courts contemporane-
ously in the pre-New Deal period of common-law ascendancy. The main
(though not exclusive) focus was to be on the pre-New Deal period because
since then, by the combined action of Congress and the United States
Supreme Court, the state courts in both the North and the South have been
excluded from any significant role in the law of labor relations. 3 No amount
of southern judicial prejudice since around 1940 could reasonably account for
unions and other worker associations composing 41 percent of the nonagricul-
trual labor force in New York and only 8.9 percent in South Carolina in 1978.
4
When I started putting together the research accumulated over many
years on the common law of labor relations, I began to realize that despite the
excellence of some of the writing at the turn of the century no one had ex-
amined accurately the role played by the conspiracy doctrine in either the
business or labor cases, especially the latter. Moreover, no one seems to have
shown satisfactorily how the eighteenth and nineteenth century judges in En-
gland and America were folding into the evolving tort theories the cognitions
provided by the developing science of economics and by the moral-political
conceptions of personal freedom and free competition stimulated by those eco-
nomic cognitions. Judges had to learn, as they did in the nineteenth century,
that personal freedom and free competition, which were gaining favor over the
centuries on ethical and juridical grounds, were also extremely valuable social
institutions that increased the wealth of nations. These concepts proved to be
powerful stimulants to the development of legal doctrine restricting anticom-
petitive conduct, whether of organized business or of organized labor.
To explain these developments adequately as well as to project the south-
ern labor cases against their background requires that this essay be published
in three installments. This first one examines the southern cases dealing with
the boycott activities of both business and labor combinations. The preoccu-
pation in this installment is with substantive law only, and it ends with some
provisional conclusions and a hypothesis about the career of unions in the
South.
Other informative books are D. MCCRACKEN, STRIKE INJUNCTIONS IN THE NEW SOUTH (1931)
and J. RHYNE, SOME SOUTHERN COTTON MILL WORKERS AND THEIR VILLAGES (1930).
2. I have tested against the cases the crusade against "government by injunction." Petro,
Injunctions and Labor Disputes: 1880-1932, 14 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 341 (1978).
3. The role of the federal legislation and of the federal authorities is discussed in notes 14-15
& 38 infra.
4. 1 am indebted to Mr. Eugene Becker of the Division of Industrial Relations of the Bureau
of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dept. of Labor, for the as yet unpublished data on the percentage of the
nonagricultural labor force organized in unions and associations. These figures ultimately will be
printed in U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DIRECTORY OF NATIONAL UNIONS AND EM-
PLOYEE ASSOCIATIONS.
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The next installment 5 will review what may be called the "procedural"
aspects of the southern cases-the way in which the southern courts dealt with
union violence, administered equitable remedies, and otherwise expressed
themselves in the labor disputes that came before them. The third install-
ment6 will be a discursive historical review and analysis of the evolution of
conspiracy and tort doctrine in Anglo-American law. Final conclusions on the
validity of the beliefs that unions have done worse than they should in the
South and that "institutional antiunionism" was responsible will be postponed
to the end of the second installment.
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SOUTHERN LABOR CASES
A substantial preponderance of the labor disputes that reached the courts
in the first third of this century involved violence in one form or another.
7
This by itself accounts for a substantial base of similarity in the attitude of all
judges, northern and southern, in labor disputes. The courts agreed that vio-
lence was unlawful, actionable, and often enjoinable. The differences among
them were procedural, not substantive: the main point of departure was when
or whether injunctive relief should be made available.8 Since it would be im-
possible to compare in the space available here the equity procedures of the
southern and northern courts in the violence cases, we have decided to post-
pone treatment of these matters.
9
We concentrate here on the substantive law of labor disputes, and more
particularly on the substantive law of peacefully but deliberately inflicted eco-
nomic harm in three areas: (1) compulsory unionism agreements, (2) stranger
picketing, and (3) other types of secondary boycotts.
It is certainly not easy to determine conclusively what the common law of
each of the southern states was on these subjects. In some of the states there
was no litigation; in others, the litigation was inadequate. In all, the state
court adjudications were influenced, sometimes decisively, by federal statutes
and by constitutional doctrines of the Supreme Court of the United States.
Nevertheless, with the focus narrowed to these subjects, it is possible to reach a
fairly satisfying conclusion on the question whether the southern courts dealt
more harshly with organized labor than did the northern courts.
Because of time and space limitations, we have had to adopt a com-
pressed form of exposition in order to cover all the southern cases decided
prior to the New Deal legislation. Discursive treatment of the evolution of the
relevant legal doctrines is postponed to the third installment of this essay.' 0
Generally, the opinions of the southern cases were in no way inferior to those
5. Part II appears later in this volume.
6. This installment will appear as a separate article in volume 60.
7. See Petro, supra note 2, at 341, 434-35, 468-71.
8. Id.
9. See note 5 supra.
10. See Petro, supra note 6.
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of the northern cases. If there were some outstandingly good opinions in the
northern cases, there were some equally good ones in the southern cases. The
same is true for outstandingly poor ones, if any.
I found no reason to distinguish the southern opinions from the northern
opinions in terms of bias or predilection. I have the impression that the South
always has been more populist, more "anti-big-business," and less taken with
the virtues of commerce and industry than the North has been. In the labor
cases I occasionally found bases for this impression, but not often enough to
ground a firm opinion one way or another.
I suppose that one might have concluded apriori that the southern judges,
trained as they were in the same common-law traditions that formed the views
of the northern judges, would have decided cases more or less as their north-
ern brethren did, reflecting the same doubts and distinctions, moved by similar
presumptions, and disciplined by the same principles and juridical ideals.
This is exactly what the cases seem to indicate. In the South, as in the North,
the decisions ranged from mildly to strongly favorable to unions and collective
bargaining. The idea that the southern courts were especially antiunion is a
myth.
II. PICKETING, SECONDARY STRIKES, AND THE CLOSED SHOP AS
SECONDARY BOYCOTTS
The efforts of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and of the
United States Supreme Court in recent years to minimize the impact on un-
ions of the secondary-boycott proscriptions of the Taft-Hartley Act"' have
worked up such a farrago of nonsense and confusion, such a profusion of ex-
culpatory doctrine and evasive exception, 12 that some effort to reintroduce
simplicity and intelligibility to the field is necessary. It is time to try to bring
back to the law the clear vision and straightforward candor that Massachusetts
Chief Judge Shaw claimed for it when he said that "[t]he law is not to be
hoodwinked by colorable pretenses. It looks at truth and reality, through
whatever disguise it may assume."'13 We will attempt to look in this way at the
type of conduct that constitutes "secondary action."
Under any consistent theory of legal relations, picketing, secondary
strikes or strike threats, and compulsory unionism agreements all would be
considered together as secondary boycotts or secondary-boycott induce-
ments. 14 This becomes apparent when the idea "secondary" is reduced to its
11. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1976).
12. See notes 14-15, 38 infra.
13. Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 111, 129 (1842).
14. I do not know of any case or comment that views the secondary boycott in quite this
comprehensive a fashion, although the early cases are full ofjudicial observations of such breadth.
For example, in Harvey v. Chapman, 226 Mass. 191, 115 N.E. 304 (1917), the court considered
union pressure on an employer to compel an employee to pay a union fine or be discharged as a
species of secondary boycott and hence unlawful when no adequate justification existed. For one
of the best analyses of secondary boycotts, see L. WOLMAN, THE BoYcoTr IN AMERICAN TRADE
1980]
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essentials. The basic pattern of the secondary boycott is D->T-->P, or: DE-
FENDANT INDUCES A THIRD PARTY TO REFRAIN FROM DEAL-
ING WITH THE PLAINTIFF. Consider the following cases:
a. During a strike for higher wages a majority union sets up a picket
line. We must assume that the picket line has a purpose, since all human
action, especially institutionalized and expensive human action, has a purpose.
The purpose of the picket line during a strike is sometimes said to be that of
communicating to the world that there is a strike going on, in order to induce
or encourage third parties to join with the strikers against the picketed party.
This is true even if the main purpose of the picket line is to see to it that the
strikers themselves do not defect by going back to work. Should this be the
objective, or one of the objectives, of the picketing, the D--3T--+P pattern still
applies. If the employer happens to be the plaintiff in such a case, it sues on a
secondary-boycott theory because it considers the union defectors to be the
parties whom the union is seeking to discourage from dealing with it.
b. Because the union represents none or few of the employees of a pick-
eted employer, it is unable to produce an effective strike. Therefore, it sets up
a picket line. This is normally called stranger picketing. No matter how the
union describes the objective of its action, it nonetheless is designed to reach
the twin ends for which unions exist: representation of employees and control
of the labor market. Whether the picketing is peaceable or violent makes no
difference. In either case, the objective is to induce or encourage third parties
to quit dealing with the picketed employer in order to induce it to recognize
the union and to confine its hiring to union members or to employees who will
be required to become union members. When the plaintiff in such a case is the
employer and the defendant is the stranger-picketing union, this is another
D->T--->P case.
c. The secondary nature of all picketing is even more obvious when it is
carried on at construction sites or at other locations where several employers
congregate. If a carpentry subcontractor happens to employ nonunion
carpenters on a construction project that is otherwise largely organized, and if
the Brotherhood of Carpenters then pickets the whole project in order to in-
duce the employees of the other contractors to quit work so that maximum
pressure will be exerted upon the general contractor to dismiss the nonunion
carpentry subcontractor, the picketing is designed to produce secondary
strikes. The plaintiff may be either the general contractor or the carpentry
UNIONS (1916). For the view that the proponents of the Taft-Hartley Act took largely the position
on secondary action that is advanced here, see S. PETRO, How THE NLRB REPEALED TAFT-
HARTLEY 3-8, 35-50, 71-107 (1958). For conventional treatment of secondary-boycott issues, see
Koretz, Federal Regulation of Secondary Strikes and Boycotts-4nother Chapter, 59 COLUM. L.
REV. 125 (1959); Lesnick, The Gravamen of the Secondary Boycott, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 1363
(1962); St. Antoine, What Makes Secondary Boycotts Secondary?, SOUTHWEST LEGAL FOUNDA-
TION, LABOR LAW DEVELOPMENTS 5 (1965). For an excellent study of more recent developments
under the National Labor Relations Act, see R. DERESHINsKY, THE NLRB AND SECONDARY
BoYcoTrs (1972).
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subcontractor. In either event this is another D--->T-->P case. The result is the
same if the picketing was carried on at a project entrance reserved for the
employees of the nonunion carpentry subcontractor.
15
d. The same applies to the secondary strikes themselves. If in the fore-
going fact situation the unions representing the employees of the other subcon-
tractors on the project order them to strike their employers in order to induce
the general contractor to dismiss the offending nonunion carpentry subcon-
tractor, the case is again one of D->T--->P. The defendants here are the unions
that instruct their members to strike; the plaintiff may be either the carpentry
subcontractor or the general contractor, in which event the other subcontrac-
tors are the third parties in the middle. Of course the other subcontractors
themselves may choose to sue if the strikes against them are in violation of no-
strike contracts, or if they can bring the case before a court that has adopted or
will adopt the prima facie tort principle, since a strike in such a case is an
unjustified infliction of harm. 16 We ignore here the possibilities of suit under
the National Labor Relations Act and its "secondary-boycott" proscriptions.
e. "Hot-cargo" arrangements are secondary-boycott commitments by
employers. Usually, they differ in no juridically significant way from the cases
already considered. In a hot-cargo arrangement the employer agrees in ad-
vance to refrain from doing business with any person whom the union repre-
senting its employees declares to be "unfair." If the employer has "agreed" to
such an arrangement only because of a strike or strike-threat by the union that
represents its employees, the case is practically identical to situation d. above.
If the employer, however, has agreed to the arrangement on its own motion,
under no pressure at all from the union-an extremely unlikely case-it will
be fallacious to consider this a D-->T--->P case because there is no entity to fill
the "T" category. Since the employer has on its own motion agreed to refrain
from dealing with "unfair" employers, the plaintiff (P) can scarcely say that
the union (D) has induced a third party (T) to refrain from dealing. In short,
if the employer has been the moving party in the hot-cargo arrangement, it
must be called a primary rather than a secondary boycott, exactly, in law, the
same as a simple strike for higher wages. In such a case, the boycotted person
can hope to recover only in a court that finds self-governing conduct actiona-
ble, or in a court that adopts the prima facie tort principle, if the refusal to deal
15. See b. above. This analysis is not to be confused with the incoherent gyrations of the
"primary-secondary dichotomy" of the NLRB and of Mr. Justice Brennan in National Woodwork
Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612 (1967), reviewed in Petro, Unions, HYousing Costs, and the
National Labor Policy, 32 LAw & CoNTEMp. PROB. 319, 335-48 (1967). For Justice Brennan's
latest exploits in the field of semantics, see his dissenting opinion in N.L.R.B. v. Retail Store
Employees' Union, 100 S. Ct. 2372 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting), in which he describes the
picketing of the customers of a struck employer as a "primary product boycott," as if by substitut-
mg "primary" for "secondary" one can change the reality of a --- ,-P case to a D--.P case.
16. Under the prima facie tort theory, one who intentionally harms another is legally liable
unless he can establish a just cause for his conduct, meaning a socially serviceable reason or
motive strong enough to overcome the presumption against him for the harm he has done. This
theory is discussed in detail in the third installment of this essay. See Petro, supra note 6, at IV.
1980]
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is a case of malice-in-fact.
1 7
f. There is no juridically significant distinction between agreements re-
quiring union membership as a condition of employment and the hot-cargo
arrangements just considered. If the employer discharges an employee or re-
fuses to hire him because of union pressure, the case is one of D--.T---P, with
the union being the defendant (D), the employer being the third party (T), and
the employee being the plaintiff (P). 18 Exactly the same is true if the em-
ployer's discharge of or refusal to hire P is pursuant to an "agreement" made
under secondary-boycott or strike pressure from the union. Compulsory
union contracts are nothing but hot-cargo contracts directly applied to employ-
ees to force them to join unions in order to get or keep a job. Of course the
employer always could choose to sue rather than agree to discriminate in this
way against employees and in favor of the union. At common law, the suit
was likely to fail in a "lawful in itself" jurisdiction, 19 but in a prima facie tort
jurisdiction it was likely to succeed because the strike threat, designed to create
an antisocial monopoly, would constitute unjustified harm. 20 On the other
hand, if the agreement to hire only through the union was voluntary and not
motivated by an antisocial objective, it would have been nonactionable even
in a prima facie tort jurisdiction, as it was in Massachusetts. 21
With these definitions and clarifications in mind, let us now consider what
the southern courts were doing in the field of secondary boycotts. As indi-
cated, we omit here consideration of all cases turning on violence, and our
concern is mainly with the pure common law. Therefore, we only incidentally
consider the right-to-work statutes and the cases thereunder, as well as the
cases affected by the New Deal and other legislation.
17. See Tuttle v. Buck, 107 Minn. 145, 119 N.W. 946 (1909) (setting up a rival barber shop
solely to drive plaintiff out of business held actionable). Cf. Hunt v. Crumboch, 325 U.S. 821
(1945) (refusal to supply labor not an antitrust violation). See note 16 supra. The caution ex-
pressed in note 15 supra is applicable here as well.
18. Employees were plaintiffs in some of the earliest and most significant cases involving the
closed shop. See, eg., Berry v. Donovan, 188 Mass. 353, 74 N.E. 603, appeal dismissed, 199 U.S.
612 (1905); Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 57 N.E. 1011 (1900); National Protective Ass'n of
Steam Fitters v. Cumming, 170 N.Y. 315, 63 N.E. 369 (1902). Indeed, in two of the best known of
the old criminal conspiracy cases, Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 111 (1842), and
Commonwealth v. Pullis, 3 Doc. Hist. 60 (Phila. Mayor's Court 1806), the prosecuting witnesses
were employees whose ouster the defendant unions were seeking. See Nelles, Commonwealth v.
Hunt, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 1128, 1133 (1932). The old criminal conspiracy cases are discussed
more fully in the third installment of this essay. See Petro, supra note 6.
19. See, e.g., Bossert v. Dhuy, 221 N.Y. 342, 117 N.E. 582 (1917); National Protective Ass'n
of Steam Fitters v. Cumming, 170 N.Y. 315, 63 N.E. 369 (1902). Under the "lawful in itself" tort
theory, an act lawful in itself cannot become unlawful and actionable because of the actor's "bad"
motives. This theory is discussed in detail in the third installment of this essay. See Petro, supra
note 6, at III.
20. See Baush Mach. Tool Co. v. Hill, 231 Mass. 30, 120 N.E. 188 (1918); Berry v. Donovan,
188 Mass. 353, 74 N.E. 603, appealdsmissed, 199 U.S. 612 (1905); Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492,
57 N.E. 1011 (1900); note 16 supra.
21. E.g., Hoban v. Dempsey, 217 Mass. 166, 104 N.E. 717 (1914). Cf. Underwood v. Texas &
Pac. Ry., 178 S.W. 38 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915) (action by employees jointly against union and em-
ployer for making allegedly unlawful preferential-hiring agreement dismissed). See note 16
supr, z
[Vol. 59
BOYCOTS IN THE SOUTHERA COURTS
III. THE CLOSED SHOP IN THE SOUTHERN CASES
In determining whether the southern courts and the common-law princi-
ples that they adopted were "liberal" (i.e., prounion), rather than "conserva-
tive" (i.e., antiunion), it would be compatible with these criteria to conclude
that the southern courts were liberal if they adopted the New York position on
the closed shop, and that they were conservative if they adopted the Massa-
chusetts position. The New York position held that the closed shop was a
lawful labor objective regardless of the means used to induce the employer to
agree to it.22 Strictly speaking, the New York courts should have held the
closed shop itself valid even if the employer had agreed to it only after and as
a result of a violent strike. Since no employer ever sought to justify violation
of a closed shop agreement on the ground that it had been procured by vio-
lence, we do not know whether the New York courts would have been that
consistent.23 This analysis, however, seems sound because the New York
courts ultimately decided that the closed shop was not "in itself' unlawful.
z4
The Massachusetts view, on the other hand, regarded the closed shop as
neither lawful nor unlawful "in itself." Applying the juristic principle that
every form of human action is privileged or prohibited only when socially
justified or unjustified, the Massachusetts court regarded the closed shop as
privileged when it was a voluntary and disinterested response by employer
and union alike to the relevant business exigencies, and unjustified if forced
upon an employer by a union in order to monopolize a labor market and
coerce above-market wages.
z5
Therefore, if we see the southern cases holding the closed shop lawful
without a separ'te evaluation of the means by which it was obtained, we may
regard them as liberal in the sense that being prounion may be regarded as
being liberal; whereas if they were basing their determination of whether the
closed shop was privileged upon the means, we may regard them as conserva-
tive and antiunion.
Analysis of all southern decisions foundprior to the enactment of the right-
to-work laws indicates that in all states but Virginia the closed shop was either
explicitly or implicitlyprivileged.z 6 One might have inferred that this was the
situation merely because the southern states thought it necessary to pass right-
22. Jacobs v. Cohen, 183 N.Y. 207, 76 N.E. 5 (1905); National Protective Ass'n of Steam
Fitters v. Cumming, 170 N.Y. 315, 63 N.E. 369 (1902); but see Curran v. Galen, 152 N.Y. 33, 46
N.E. 297 (1897) (per curiam). See also Petro, supra note 6, at IV, B. Of course if the means were
unlawful "in themselves," e.g., violent assaults, they would be regarded as actionable and enjoin-
able. But see Nann v. Raimist, 255 N.Y. 307, 174 N.E. 690 (1931). But such a decision would say
nothing about the closed shop as an objective.
23. See Schlesinger v. Quinto, 201 A.D. 487, 194 N.Y.S. 401 (1922), in which a New York
court for the first time granted specific performance against an employer violation of a closed shop
agreement. There is no sign in either the majority opinion or the dissent of a defense based on
violent union procurement of the collective agreement.
24. Jacobs v. Cohen, 183 N.Y. 207, 76 N.E. 5 (1905).
25. See cases cited notes 18 & 20-21 supra.
26. The relevant decisions of the confederate states are as follows:
19801
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to-work laws in order to outlaw compulsory unionism. In any event, the cases
Alabama. Kinard Constr. Co. v. Building Trades Council, 258 Ala. 500, 64 So. 2d 400 (1953)
(per curiam), rey'dper curiam onfederalpreemption ground, 346 U.S. 933 (1954) (stranger picket-
ing for closed shop would have been privileged but for federal law against it); Kibanoff v. Tri-
Cities Retail Clerks' Union, 258 Ala. 479, 64 So. 2d 393 (1953) (closed shop contract lawful if
made with majority union); Hotel & Restaurant Employees v. Greenwood, 249 Ala. 265, 30 So. 2d
696 (1947) (relying on RESTATMENT (FiRsT) OF TORTS § 783 (1939) to hold that closed shop is
lawful objective); Local 57, Bhd. of Painters v. Boyd, 245 Ala. 227, 16 So. 2d 705 (1944) (wrongful
expulsion suit brought by member against union implicitly concedes legality of closed shop).
Arkansas. Harmon v. UMW, 166 Ark. 255, 266 S.W. 84 (1924) (legality of closed shop im-
plicitly recognized in action for damages brought by employee for wrongfully procuring his dis-
charge); Local 313, Hotel & Restaurant Employee's Int'l Alliance v. Stathakis, 135 Ark. 86, 205
S.W. 450 (1918) (coercive picketing for closed shop enjoined but seemingly implicit acceptance of
legality of closed shop objective).
Florida. Harper v. Hoecherl, 153 Fla. 29, 14 So. 2d 179 (1943) (legality of closed shop implic-
itly recognized in decision upholding union privilege to expel members for violating union rule
against spray-painting device); Retail Clerks Local 779 v. Lerner Shops, 140 Fla.. 865, 193 So. 2d
529 (1939) (per curiam) (stran.er picketing for closed shop enjoined solely on ground that em-
ployer was operating on nondiscriminatory open shop principle); Jetton-Dekle Lumber Co. v.
Mather, 53 Fla. 969, 43 So. 590 (1907) (monopolistic secondary strikes for closed shop held privi-
leged).
Georgia. Jones v. Hearst Consol. Publications, 190 Ga. 762, 10 S.E.2d 761 (1940) (in action
for violation of collective agreement legality of closed shop clause implicitly accepted); McMi-
chael v. Atlanta Envelope Co., 151 Ga. 776, 108 S.E. 226 (1921) (yellow-dog contract held lawful;
closed shop implicitly accepted as lawful objective of picketing although picketing as inducement
of breach of contract enjoined); Callan v. Exposition Cotton Mills, 149 Ga. 119, 99 S.E. 300 (1919)
(same as McMichael); Employing Printers' Club v. Doctor Blosser Co., 122 Ga. 509, 50 S.E. 353
(1905) (employer combination to drive plaintiff employer out of business held actionable on prima
facie tort grounds while closed shop agreements implicitly accepted); Brown v. Jacobs Pharmacy
Co., 115 Ga. 429, 41 S.E. 553 (1902) (business combination case holding boycott of competitive
druggist an enjoinable conspiracy and reviewing union and employer combination cases without
indicating attitude on legality of closed shop).
Louisiana. Baton Rouge Bldg. Trades Council v. T.L. James & Co., 201 La. 749, 796-801, 10
So. 2d 606, 622-23 (1942) (strike, picketing for closed shop held privileged even when total mo-
nopoly of relevant labor market avowedly sought and encouraged by local authorities; following
New York decisions); Volquardsen v. Southern Amusement Co., 156 So. 678 (La. Ct. App. 1934)
(legality of closed shop implicitly affirmed in wrongful discharge case); Nyland v. United Bhd. of
Carpenters Local 1960, 156 La. 604, 100 So. 733 (1924) (same as Volquardsen); Local 76, United
Bhd. of Carpenter v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 143 La. 901, 79 So. 532 (1918) (legality of closed
shop implicitly affirmed in intra-union dispute); Monroe v. Colored Screwmen's Benevolent
Ass'n, 135 La. 893, 66 So. 260 (1914) (legality of closed shop conceded in dismissal of action for
wrongful expulsion); Schneider v. Local 60, United Ass'n of Journeymen Plumbers, 116 La. 270,
40 So. 700 (1905) (same as Monroe; but see) Webb v. Drake, 52 La. Ann. 290, 26 So. 791 (Sup. Ct.
1899) (businessmen's boycott held actionable on prima facie tort principle in contrast to cases
holding closed shop privileged)).
MAississopi. Mississippi Theatres Corp. v. Local 615, Int'l Alliance of Theatrical Stage Em-
ployees, 174 Miss. 439, 164 So. 887 (1936) (union suit upheld against employer for violation of
collective agreement including closed shop clause).
North Carolina. McGinnis v. Raleigh Typographical Local 54, 182 N.C. 770, 108 S.E. 728
(1921) (per curiam) (legality of closed shop implicitly accepted); State v. Van Pelt, 136 N.C. 633,
49 S.E. 177 (1904) (blacklisting, secondary strike threats to force discharge of nonunionists held
privileged on absolute rights grounds, following New York view and Allen v. Flood (see text ac-
companying notes 31-32 infra)).
South Carolina. Jarrett v. Southern Ry., 35 Lab. Cas. 71779 (S.C. C.P. 1958) (right-to-work
law not retroactive; tacit suggestion that closed shop was previously privileged); Sams v. Bhd. of
Ry. and Steamship Clerks Lodge 6193, 233 F.2d 263 (4th Cir. 1956) (per curiam) (dictum support-
ing Jarrett but court holds right-to-work law preempted).
Tennessee. Lyle v. Local 452, Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 174 Tenn. 222, 124 S.W.2d 701
(1939) (stranger picketing of self-employed butcher held enjoinable in absence of "labor dispute";
no position on closed shop expressed), overruled in Ira A. Watson Co. v. Wilson, 187 Tenn. 402,
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show that in all southern states, except Virginia, the closed shop was explicitly
and implicitly considered lawful in itself, as a corollary of the proposition that
unionists had absolute rights to individually or collectively refuse to work with
nonunionists.
Indeed, if the situations in North Carolina and Texas are suggestive of
general judicial attitudes in the South, one may conclude that the South was
more "liberal" than New York. During a time when New York was still wa-
vering on the legality of the closed shop,27 and when Connecticut,28 New
Jersey,29 and Pennsylvania3" were holding that other-governing boycotts
designed to compel the discharge of nonunionists were actionable or even in-
dictable as criminal conspiracies, North Carolina, in State v. Van Pelt,3 1 held,
on pure "lawful in itself' grounds reminiscent of Allen v. Flood,32 that a com-
prehensive boycott designed to impose the closed shop was not aimed at an
unlawful objective and hence was not indictable. Moreover, long before the
215 S.W.2d 801 (1948) (U.S. Supreme Court had meanwhile held peaceful picketing lawful under
fourteenth amendment regardless of whether "labor dispute" existed); Lichter v. Fulcher, 22
Tenn. App. 670, 125 S.W.2d 501 (1939) (use of union's labor monopoly by business combination
to punish competitive employer held actionable and enjoinable, but legality of closed shop tacitly
accepted); Powers v. Journeymen Bricklayers' Local 3, 130 Tenn. 643, 172 S.W. 284 (1914) (tacit
acceptance of legality of closed shop in successful action by employer against union for failing to
inform him that it had reduced its wage scales); Marshall v. City of Nashville, 109 Tenn. 495, 71
S.W. 815 (1903) (city ordinance requiring union label on all city purchases held unconstitutional).
Texas. AFL v. Mann, 188 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945) (upholding statute that recog-
nized legality of closed shop); Lundine v. McKinney, 183 S.W.2d (Tex. Civ. App. 1944) (legality
of closed shop implicitly accepted in wrongful expulsion case); The Fair, Inc. v. Retail Clerks
Local 131, 157 S.W.2d 716 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) (upholding denial of temporary injunction
against stranger picketing for closed shop); San Angelo v. Meat Cutters Local 103, 139 S.W.2d 843
(Tex. Civ. App. 1940) (same as The Fair, Inc.); Culinary Workers' Local 331 v. Fuller, 105 S.W.2d
295 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) (stranger picketing for closed shop enjoined but without holding closed
shop an unlawful objective); Harper v. Local 520, Int'l Bhd. of Electrical Workers, 48 S.W.2d 1033
(Tex. Civ. App. 1932) (legality of closed shop explicitly declared and specific performance of
agreement ordered, following New York cases); McCantz v. Brotherhood of Painters, 13 S.W.2d
902 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929) (action for wrongful expulsion upheld but validity of closed shop agree-
ment unchallenged); Cooks' Union v. Papageorge, 230 S.W. 1086 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921) (in-
timidatory picketing enjoined without any suggestion that closed shop objective was unlawful);
Underwoodv. Texas & Pac. Ry., 178 S.W. 38 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915) (employee suit to invalidate
preferential hiring contract dismissed on strength of New York cases upholding closed shop);
Cotton Jammers' Local 2 v. Taylor, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 367, 56 S.W. 553 (1900) (action by union
member for wrongful expulsion denied for failure to show how expulsion harmed him; apparent
failure to allege union control of employment by use of closed shops). See generally Jeffers, The
Labor Injunction in Texas Courts Today, 36 TEx. L. REv. 938 (1958).
Virginia. Crump v. Commonwealth, 84 Va. 927, 6 S.E. 620 (1888) (boycott to compel dis-
charge of nonunionists held criminal conspiracy).
See Table 1.
27. Jacobs v. Cohen, 183 N.Y. 207, 76 N.E. 5 (1905), which had upheld the closed shop,
avoided any suggestion that it was overruling Curran v. Galen, 152 N.Y. 33, 46 N.E. 297 (1897),
which had held a union shop agreement invalid. Cf. David Mach. Co. v. Robinson, 41 Misc. 329,
84 N.Y.S. 837 (1903) (closed shop held unlawful strike objective).
28. State v. Glidden, 55 Conn. 46, 8 A. 890 (1887).
29. State v. Donaldson, 32 N.J.L. 151 (1867).
30. Erdman v. Mitchell, 207 Pa. 79, 56 A. 327 (1903).
31: 136 N.C. 633, 49 S.E. 177 (1904).
32. [1898] A.C. 1. This decision is considered at length in the third installment of this essay.
See Petro supra note 6, at HI.
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New York courts were to reach the same result, Texas held that a colletive
agreement providing for a closed shop was fully enforceable.
33
This apparent paradox can be cleared up if one gives the term "liberal" its
real contemporary meaning-that is, reactionary. The coercively imposed
closed shop implies regimentation of industry and restraints of trade and of
labor market competition along the lines of the medieval gild system-restric-
tions on the free movement of labor and on free competition among workers.
The paradox thus lies in the confiscation of the term "liberalism" by reactiona-
ries. George Orwell wrote about such things.
Because restrictionism resembles slavery in some ways, the southern
states would be familiar with it. For example, South Carolina in early days
had a statute forbidding the landing of free negroes in its territory and provid-
ing for their enslavement immediately upon landing. In Elkison v. Deliesse-
line,34 Mr. Justice Johnson of the Supreme Court of the United States held on
circuit that the statute was incompatible with the Commerce Clause. There-
fore, he granted the plaintiff a writ de homine repleg/ando (replevin of an indi-
vidual) although he recognized that the writ might not be effective against a
recalcitrant South Carolina sheriff.
It does not seem outlandish to conclude that a society that tolerated the
barriers to free labor competition implicit in slavery would find nothing repug-
nant in the closed shop. Of course the closed shop is not identical with slav-
ery.35 Indeed, when the closed shop is purely voluntary and contractual, that
is, obtained by genuine, legal consideration, it is sharply distinguishable; it is
then much the same as any other exclusive requirements contract. But when
coercively imposed, the closed shop does share features with slavery: it closes
off the labor market to both employers and employees and eliminates free
competition, which is the opposite of slavery. Therefore, it is not really sur-
prising that the closed shop was approved by southern courts, in contrast to so
many northern courts. Nor is it surprising that the only southern state that
frowned upon the closed shop was Virginia.36 Virginia was on the border in
more ways than one.
At any rate, our review of the southern cases thus far establishes one point
fairly solidly. If unions failed to flourish in the South before right-to-work
33. See Underwood v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 178 S.W. 38 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915). As of 1902 the
New York courts were holding that collective agreements were not specifically enforceable, e.g.,
Stone Cleaning and Pointing Union v. Russell, 38 Misc. 513, 77 N.Y.S. 1049 (1902). The first
reported decision in New York granting specific performance of a collective agreement was
Schlesinger v. Quinto, 117 Misc. 735, 192 N.Y.S. 564 (1922), aI'd, 201 A.D. 487, 194 N.Y.S. 401
(1922).
34. 8 F. Cas. 493 (C.C.D.S.C. 1823).
35. For an investigation of the relationships between collective bargaining under the exclu-
sive representation principle and the badges and incidents of slavery that the thirteenth amend-
ment was designed to extirpate, see Vieira, Of Syndicalism, Slavery andthe ThirteenthAmendment.
The Unconstitutionality of "Exclusive Representation" in Public-Sec/or Employment, 12 WKE
FOREST L. REv. 515, 672-95, 761-84 (1976).
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* All the cases relevant to the legality of the closed shop from the confederate states prior to
enactment of right-to-work laws are collected and briefed in note 26.
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laws were passed, it was not because they were denied the closed shop. Table
I, which summarizes the case law, shows that the closed shop was more widely
privileged in the South than it was in the North.
37
IV. PICKETING: BY EMPLOYEES AND BY STRANGERS
Although picketing of any variety normally operates and is intended to
operate as a secondary-boycott inducement, the southern courts, like most of
the other courts of the Nation, placed picketing by the employees of the pick-
eted employer, when located at the scene of the labor dispute, in the same
category as the strike: lawful "primary action" if peaceable and designed for
the economic betterment of the striking or picketing employees. Strikes are
purely self-governing activities, while picketing is designed to influence rela-
tionships among others; but this made no difference to the southern courts or
to most northern courts. In the South, as in the North, however, some of the
courts distinguished between picketing by employees and picketing by stran-
gers.38 Whereas peaceful "primary" picketing by employees was almost uni-
37. See note 26 and accompanying text supra. The northern views on the closed shop are
discussed at length in the third installment of this essay. See Petro, supra note 6, at IV & V.
38. The legal status of stranger picketing for recognition easily ranks among the most impor-
tant issues in labor law, for whether the bargaining status of unions is the voluntary choice of
employees often turns upon it. If stranger picketing is privileged, whether as a matter of express
law or because of constitutional or administrative barriers to control by courts and legislatures,
unions in many cases will achieve bargaining status contrary to the will of the employees involved.
This is possible because, as is normally true of the person in the middle in secondary boycotts, the
economic harm done to the employer by the picketing often will induce it to accept the union as
bargaining agent even though, given a choice, the employees might prefer to go either unrepre-
sented or represented by some other union.
An adequate account of the law relating to stranger picketing is not possible here. But if the
southern cases are to be appraised with any confidence, some account of the history of the law of
stranger picketing is necessary. The United States Supreme Court first established a narrowly
qualified privilege for stranger picketing in American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades
Council, 257 U.S. 184 (1921). Later it held stranger picketing privileged as a form of free speech
in a case brought by employees who objected to being represented by the picketing union. AFL v.
Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941). Still later, the Court took the position that stranger picketing over the
objection of employees was not entitled to constitutional protection as freedom of speech. Team-
sters Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957); Building Serv. Employees v. Gazzam, 339 U.S.
532 (1950). But the Court also held that while a union could not claim free speech rights to force
itself upon unwilling employees by stranger picketing, state courts, nevertheless, could not enjoin
such picketing because it had been preempted by the NLRA. Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346
U.S. 485 (1953). The Court reaffirmed this position in San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Gar-
mon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959), but a year later, in NLRB v. Teamsters Local 639, 362 U.S. 274 (1960),
it held that nothing in the NLRA prohibited stranger picketing, so that the NLRB also was with-
out authority to prevent it. The following year, in Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB,
366 U.S. 731 (1961), the Court held that both a union and an employer violated the NLRA-the
union when it asked for and the employer when it granted recognition without establishing that
the union was the free choice of a majority of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit.
Thus, although by the Supreme Court's own decisions stranger picketing was neither prohibited
by the NLRA nor compatible with its policy of free employee choice, neither the NLRB nor state
courts could restrain it, and the federal courts could not enjoin it because of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976). Clearly the Court was intent upon establishing a privilege for
the coercive attainment of bargaining status by unions that employees did not want. Meanwhile,
in 1959, Congress again tried to restrict stranger picketing by adding § 8(b)(7) to the Taft-Hartley
Act, which made stranger picketing for recognition an unfair labor practice. Landrum-Griffin
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versally held privileged,39 picketing by persons not employed in the picketed
establishment-stranger picketing-was considered by some of the southern
courts to be unjustified, especially when the employer was getting along well
with its employees, paying them above union scale, and not discriminating
against union members. These courts could see no social justification for the
harm done by the stranger picketing.
Assessing the common-law status of picketing in the southern courts is
complicated in some instances by the lack of decisions, and in others by the
intervention of such extraneous influences as state statutes, the federal labor
relations legislation, and the Supreme Court's constitutional inventions under
the free speech and preemption doctrines.40 Evaluating the cases as best we
can under the circumstances, they line up as indicated in Table 2. State-by-
state, the picketing decisions follow:
Alabama. As the state of origin of the celebrated Thornhill case,41 Ala-
bama occupies a special place in the history of the law of picketing. From an
Act, Pub. L. No. 86-257, § 704(c), 73 Stat. 519 (1959) (amending 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1976)). For a
brief account of the career of this legislation that ignores its major purpose-protecting the free-
dom of choice of employee-see R. GORMAN, BAsIc TExT ON LABOR LAW UNIONIZATION AND
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 220-39 (1976). Apparently Gorman believes that only employers in-
vade that freedom. Id at 132-208. For Gorman's extremely selective guide to the relevant peri-
odical literature, see id at 839-40.
For an analysis of the role of the NLRB in establishing a privileged statute for stranger
picketing, notwithstanding congressional efforts to restrict it, see S. PETRO, supra note 14, at 1-34,
51-70.
Although in the earlier years of the common-law period the lower New York courts had in
numerous cases enjoined stranger picketing for recognition, see cases collected in Petro, supra
note 2, at 509-46, the New York Court of Appeals later held it to be privileged. J.H. & S. Thea-
tres, Inc. v. Fay, 260 N.Y. 315, 183 N.E. 509 (1932); Stillwell Theatre, Inc. v. Kaplan, 259 N.Y.
405, 182 N.E. 63 (1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 606 (1933); Exchange Bakery & Restaurant, Inc. v.
Rifkin, 245 N.Y. 260, 157 N.E. 130 (1927). But see Goodwins, Inc. v. Hagedon, 303 N.Y. 300, 101
N.E.2d 697 (1951) (picketing for recognition while question of representation still unsettled held
enjoinable). During the same general period, a number of the other state courts were finding
stranger picketing for recognition tortious and enjoinable. E.g., Moore v. Cooks' Union, 39 Cal.
App. 538, 179 P. 417 (1919); Bull v. Theatrical Stage Employees Local 414, 119 Kan. 713, 241 P.
459 (1925); Hotel Employees Local 181 v. Miller, 272 Ky. 466, 114 S.W.2d 501 (1938); Music Hall
Theatre v. Moving Picture Mach. Operators' Local 165, 249 Ky. 639, 61 S.W.2d 283 (1933); New
England Wood Heel Co. v. Nolan, 268 Mass. 191, 167 N.E. 323 (1929); Goyette v. C.V. Watson
Co., 245 Mass. 577, 140 N.E. 285 (1923); Harvey v. Chapman, 226 Mass. 191, 115 N.E. 304 (1917);
Gevas v. Greek Restaurant Workers Club, 99 N.J. Eq. 770, 134 A. 309 (1926); Heitkemper v.
Central Labor Council, 99 Or. 1, 192 P. 765 (1920). But see Berger v. Superior Court, 175 Cal.
719, 167 P. 143 (1917).
For a federal court injunction against stranger picketing during the period of "government by
injunction," see Waitresses' Local 249 v. Benish Restaurant Co., 6 F.2d 568 (8th Cir. 1925).
In light of the foregoing authorities, the relatively few instances in which southern courts
enjoined stranger picketing suggest that, on the whole, the southern courts should be ranked
among the more "liberal" (i.e., prounion) courts of the country.
39. Judge McPherson's oft-quoted comment that the concept "peaceful picketing" was as
much a contradiction in terms as "chaste vulgarity" or "lawful lynching," Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry.
v. Gee, 139 F. 582, 584 (C.C.S.D. Iowa 1905), may have been sound enough, but it certainly did
not represent general judicial opinion either at that time or since then. See generally Petro, supra
note 2, at 455-63 (data on injunctions against peaceful primary picketing).
40. See note 38 supra.
41. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
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early date, Alabama had a statute explicitly applying the prima facie tort the-
ory42 to picketing. It declared that all picketing was unlawful unless sup-
ported by a "just cause."43 Under this statute all picketing, including peaceful
picketing in connection with a lawful strike, was held unlawful and enjoin-
able.44 In Thornhill v. Alabama the United States Supreme Court put an end
to this by declaring, in effect, that because of the first and fourteenth amend-
ments, the prima facie tort theory had to succumb to the absolute rights the-
ory, at least for peaceful picketing accompanying a lawful strike.45
Applying Thornhill, the Alabama Supreme Court later held that even
picketing for the closed shop was privileged, 46 unless the picketing union did
not represent a majority of the employees of the picketed employer.47 This
might have suggested that stranger picketing was unlawful "in itself' 48 in Ala-
bama. In the Kinard case,49 however, the Alabama Supreme Court found that
under Alabama common law stranger picketing was privileged, but it was held
unlawful because it violated section 8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA. The U.S.
Supreme Court, however, made short shrift of this loyal effort by the Alabama
court, curtly reversing it per curiam.50
The rather tangled history of picketing in Alabama reduces to this. As a
42. See note 16 supra.
43. ALA. CODE § 3488 (1923) (repealed).
44. Hardie-Tynes Mfg. Co. v. Cruse, 189 Ala. 66, 66 So. 657 (1914). O'Rourke v. City of
Birmingham, 27 Ala. App. 133, 168 So. 206, cert. denied, 232 Ala. 355, 168 So. 209 (1936).
45. 3 10 U.S. at 105. The reader no doubt will observe in this course of reasoning a suggestion
of how the Bill of Rights might impair freedom rather than promote it. By naming certain free-
doms, or aspects of freedom, as "rights," the Bill of Rights gave the Supreme Court the opportu-
nity to grant such freedoms as it favored, e.g., freedom of the press, a status far above that of equal
aspects of freedom such as the right of private property, especially the property right in reputation.
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), is a good example of this kind ofjuristic anom-
aly, of which the U.S. Reports are full. The prima facie tort theory would compel courts to harmo-
nize intersecting, overlapping, and conflicting exercises of freedom. See note 16 supra. The
Supreme Court's method, sometimes called "balancing," really involves chopping off the immuni-
ties of some persons and adding them as special privileges to the rights of others. This is what the
Supreme Court did in the New York Times case; it is also what the Court did when it held that the
right of employees to self-organization should be "balanced" against the property rihts of em-
ployers by compelling the latter to permit unions to use company premises when it otherwise
would be costly or difficult for them to organize employees. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351
U.S. 105 (1956). This reasoning is a recipe for confiscation, and not for the promotion of freedom.
The technique is attacked sharply in Vieira, Rights andthe United States Constitution: The Declen-
s/onfrom Natural Law to Legal Positivism, 13 GA. L. REV. 1447, 1480-1500 (1979). But Vieira
fails to recognize that the enumeration of certain rights in the first ten amendments might have
been the origin of the problem, despite the effort made in the ninth amendment to stimulate
something like the prima facie tort theory by providing that "[t]he enumeration in the Constitu-
tion, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."
U.S. CONsT. amend. IX.
46. Shiland v. Retail Clerks Local 1657, 259 Ala. 277, 66 So. 2d 146 (1953); Hotel & Restau-
rant Employees v. Greenwood, 249 Ala. 265, 30 So. 2d 696 (1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 847
(1948), contemptproceedings dismissedsub nom. Expare Hacker, 250 Ala. 64, 33 So.2d 324 (1947).
47. Klibanoffv. Tri-Cities Retail Clerks' Local 1678, 258 Ala. 749, 64 So. 2d 393 (1953).
48. See note 19 supra.
49. Kinard Constr. Co. v. Building Trades Council, 258 Ala. 500, 64 So. 2d 400 (1953), rev'd
per curiam, 346 U.S. 933 (1954).
50. 346 U.S. 933 (1954) (per curiam).
[Vol. 59
BOYCOTTS IN THE SOUTHERN COURTS
matter of Alabama common law, peaceful picketing, whether by strangers or
by employees during a strike, was privileged. The Alabama statute prohibit-
ing all picketing was held invalid on free speech grounds in Thornhill, and a
court decision prohibiting stranger picketing as a violation of the NLRA was
reversed on preemption grounds in Kinard.
Arkansas. The legal status of picketing at common law in Arkansas is
obscure because no decision was reported until after the free speech doctrine
of Thornhill was announced by the Supreme Court. In the only relevant Ar-
kansas picketing case found, the court held that peaceful picketing for recogni-
tion was privileged free speech, even though the employees of the picketed
employer had shown that they were not interested in having the union repre-
sent them.
51
Florida. In the Retail Clerks case,52 the only Florida decision uncompli-
cated by the free speech and preemption doctrines, the Florida Supreme Court
held that stranger picketing for recognition and for the closed shop was enjoin-
able as unjustified harm when the employer ran a nondiscriminatory open
shop, its employees seemed satisfied with their lot, and it in no way discour-
aged its employees from joining the union.53 After Thornhill, however, the
Florida court held stranger picketing to be privileged, 54 unless enmeshed in
violence,55 or unless aimed at the closed shop in violation of the state right-to-
work law.56 Eventually the United States Supreme Court held that under the
preemption doctrine the Florida court could not enjoin stranger picketing for
the closed shop, 57 or picketing of a railroad terminal during a strike against
one of the railroads having a proprietary interest in the terminal.
58
Not much can be said with confidence about the status of picketing in
Florida at common law. The Retail Clerks case disapproved of stranger pick-
eting by a union that the employees, given a free choice, had rejected. But
since the Florida court earlier had held that secondary action by a union
avowedly aiming at a monopoly was privileged, 59 its qualified opposition to
stranger picketing does not seem to indicate any notable antiunion stance.
Georgia. This state, as a matter of common law, held picketing privi-
51. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Local 802 v. Asimos, 216 Ark. 694, 227 S.W.2d 154
(1950).
52. Retail Clerks Local 779 v. Lerner Shops, 140 Fla. 865, 193 So. 2d 529 (1940).
53. Id at 866, 193 So. 2d at 530.
54. Hotel & Rest. Employees Local 156 v. Cothron, 59 So. 2d 366 (Fla. 1952); Johnson v.
White Swan Laundry, 41 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 1949); Whitehead v. Miami Laundry, 160 Fla. 667, 36
So. 2d 382 (1948).
55. Moore v. City Dry Cleaners & Laundry, Inc., 41 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 1949).
56. Plumbers & Pipe Fitters' Local 519 v. Robertson, 44 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 1950).
57. Ladies' Garment Workers Local 415 v. Scherer & Sons, 390 U.S. 717 (1968).
58. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369 (1969).
59. But see Jetton-Dekle Lumber Co. v. Mather, 53 Fla. 969, 43 So. 590 (1907).
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leged, whether by employees or strangers, unless it was violent, intimidatory,
or enmeshed in coercion.60 The free speech doctrine hence produced no
change in the substantive law of picketing in Georgia, only a decision explic-
itly holding stranger picketing privileged whether "primary" or "secondary."'6'
Later, when induced by the employee-free choice principle of the NLRA to
hold stranger picketing for recognition unlawful and enjoinable,62 the Georgia
court found its jurisdiction preempted by the Supreme Court of the United
States.
63
Louisiana. It is not possible to determine what the Louisiana common
law would have been on picketing, since the Johnson case,64 the first reported
decision, came in 1940, the same year the free speech doctrine was established
in Thornhill. Nevertheless, the Johnson case reflected the New York position.
In a dispute with a dairy, a Teamsters local picketed the retailers who
purchased from the dairy. This picketing was held to be "primary," in the
sense established by the New York court in Goldfinger v. Feintuch,65 and
hence privileged. Besides, said the court, the Louisiana anti-injunction law
prohibited injunctive relief against peaceful picketing.
66
Some years later, the Louisiana Supreme Court cast doubt on the Johnson
decision by observing that the court there had not recognized that the equity
jurisdiction of the Louisiana courts was granted by the Louisiana Constitution
and could not be abridged by statute.67 Stranger picketing in a rival union
dispute, therefore, was held enjoinable as an unjustified infliction of harm.68
Three years later, in 1955, a similar decision was reversed by the Supreme
Court of the United States on preemption grounds. 69 A year later, the
Supreme Court again reversed a Louisiana antipicketing decision on preemp-
tion grounds.
70
60. Robinson v. Bryant, 181 Ga. 722, 184 S.E. 298 (1936); McMichael v. Atlanta Envelope
Co., 151 Ga. 776, 108 S.E. 226 (1921); Burgess v. Ga. F. & A. Ry. Co., 148 Ga. 415, 96 S.E. 864
(1918) (Pickets were former employees who had been replaced during a strike, and although there
was much violence an injunction against all picketing was vacated.).
61. Mason & Dixon Lines, Inc. v. Odom, 193 Ga. 471, 18 S.E.2d 841 (1942).
62. Ellis v. Parks, 212 Ga. 540, 93 S.E.2d 708 (1956); but see Parks v. Atlanta Printing Press-
men Local 8, 150 F. Supp. 246 (N.D. Ga. 1956), rev'd, 243 F.2d 284 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 354
U.S. 937 (1957) (dismissing an action against the same union because there was no violation of the
NLRA). The federal court decision appears to have been handed down before the state decision,
but perhaps it had not been brought to the attention of the Georgia court.
63. Construction & Gen. Laborers' Local 438 v. Curry, 371 U.S. 542 (1963), rev'g 217 Ga.
512, 123 S.E.2d 653 (1962).
64. Johnson v. Milk Drivers Local 854, 195 So. 791 (La. Ct. App. 1940).
65. 276 N.Y. 281, 11 N.E.2d 910 (1937).
66. 195 So. at 796.
67. Twiggs v. Journeyman Barbers, 58 So. 2d 298 (La. Ct. App. 1952), approved/n Douglas
Pub. Serv. Corp. v. Gaspard, 225 La. 972, 983, 74 So. 2d 182, 186 (1954).
68. 58 So. 2d at 302.
69. Godchaux Sugars, Inc. v. Chaisson, 227 La. 146, 78 So. 2d 673 (1955), vacated as moot sub
nom. Chaisson v. Southcoast Corp., 350 U.S. 899 (1955) (per curiam).
70. UMW v. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co., 351 U.S. 62 (1956), rev'g 227 La. 1109, 81 So. 2d
413 (1955).
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If the Johnson case is considered as Louisiana's only purely common-law
decision on picketing, one must conclude that Louisiana too, at least before
the era of the NLRA and the free speech doctrine, saw nothing wrong in pick-
eting. Indeed, the Louisiana court later ruled against stranger picketing only
because of the obvious conflict between such picketing and the basic policy of
the NLRA, pursuant to which the bargaining status of unions was to depend
upon the choices of employees and not upon the coercive potential of picket-
ing.
7 1
Mississippi. The earliest picketing decision found in Mississippi, en-
joining secondary picketing aimed at the closed shop in violation of the state
right-to-work law, was reversed on preemption grounds by the United States
Supreme Court.72 A few years later, having learned its lesson, the Mississippi
Supreme Court vacated an injunction against construction site picketing alleg-
edly designed to induce the general contractor on the project to hire only
union labor, in violation of the right-to-work law.73 The court held that if the
injunction was based on the alleged violation of the right-to-work law, it was
preempted. If it was issued because the picketing induced the unionized em-
ployees of the plaintiff, the plumbing subcontractor, to leave their work in
violation of a collective agreement, the agreement should have been pleaded
or the pleadings amended to conform with the proof. The plaintiff had done
neither.
Without reported decisions, one cannot tell what the common-law posi-
tion on picketing was in Mississippi. Because there were unions in the state
and because unions tend to strike and picket unless restrained by courts, the
absence of any decision suggests that picketing was privileged in Mississippi,
at least when peaceful.
North Carolina. Picketing decisions were scarce also in North Carolina.
The 1921 decision in the McGinnis case shows,74 however, that peaceful pick-
eting accompanying a strike was privileged. In McGinnis the North Carolina
Supreme Court vacated a temporary injunction against intimidatory picketing
because conflicting affidavits were not strong enough proof to support the or-
der. The only other relevant decision came after enactment of the state right-
to-work law and held that secondary construction site picketing aimed at the
closed shop was enjoinable and not preempted.75
71. See note 38 supra.
72. Hattiesburg Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Broome, 377 U.S. 126 (1964), revyg 247
Miss. 458, 153 So. 2d 695 (1963).
73. Hattiesburg Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mississippi Mechanical Contractors, 207
So. 2d 99 (Miss. 1968).
74. McGinnis v. Raleigh Typographical Local 54, 182 N.C. 770, 108 S.E. 728 (1921) (per
curiam).
75. Jones Constr. Co. v. Electrical Workers Local 755, 246 N.C. 481, 98 S.E.2d 852 (1957).
For other North Carolina cases that grew out of picketing for the closed shop but did not deal with
the legality of the picketing, see Poole & Kent Corp. v. C.E. Thurston & Sons, Inc., 286 N.C. 121,
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A reasonable conclusion to draw from the slender authority available is
that peaceful picketing by employees was privileged at common law in North
Carolina. It may be inferred from State v. Van Pelt76 that in the absence of a
statute peaceable secondary and stranger picketing would be privileged as
well.
South Carolina. No picketing decisions prior to 1960 have been found in
South Carolina, but the 1960 decision in Piedmont Shirt Co. v. Clothing Work-
ers7 7 is interesting. The defendant union picketed the plaintiffs customers
nationwide after it failed to induce the plaintiff's employees to join or to get
the NLRB to force on the employer recognition of the union. This has become
a common device of unions, especially in the South, that are unable to acquire
representative status legitimately. The South Carolina Supreme Court ob-
served that this secondary stranger picketing undoubtedly would have been
considered tortious at common law (presumably on the prima facie tort theory
since obviously there could be no just cause supporting a union's attempt to
force itself on unwilling employees). The court, however, dissolved a tempo-
rary restraining order against the picketing on preemption grounds. 78
Tennessee. The Tennessee courts distinguished between picketing by em-
ployees, picketing by strangers, and picketing aimed at securing the closed
shop in violation of the state right-to-work law. When employee picketing
itself was peaceable, the Tennessee Supreme Court ruled that it could not be
enjoined even though accompanied by violence.79 On the other hand, stranger
picketing designed to compel self-employed butchers80 or barbers,81 respec-
tively, to join the picketing union and to observe cartel rules was held unlaw-
ful and enjoinable. Similarly, the Tennessee courts enjoined stranger
picketing for the union shop as a violation of the state right-to-work law.8 2
Even though the United States Supreme Court vacated such a decision per
curiam, presumably on preemption grounds,8 3 the Tennessee Supreme Court
found it hard to believe that it could not enjoin conduct that Congress ex-
pressly reserved to the authority of the states in section 14(b) of the Taft-Hart-
209 S.E.2d 450 (1974) (see note 208 and accompanying text infra); Beaty v. Asbestos Workers, 248
N.C. 170, 102 S.E.2d 763 (1958).
76. 136 N.C. 633,49 S.E. 177 (1904) (secondary strike threats to force discharge of nonunion-
ists held privileged on absolute-rights grounds). See text accompanying note 377 supra.
77. 237 S.C. 13, 115 S.E.2d 499 (1960) (per curiam).
78. Id at 17, 115 S.E.2d at 500.
79. Rowe Transfer & Storage Co. v. Teamsters Local 621, 186 Tenn. 265, 271-72, 209 S.W.2d
35, 37 (1948) (distinguishing between violence enmeshed in picketing and "disassociated acts of
violence").
80. Lyle v. Local 452, Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 174 Tenn. 222, 124 S.W.2d 701 (1939)
overruled in Ira A. Watson Co. v. Wilson, 187 Tenn. 402, 404-06, 215 S.W.2d 801, 802-03 (1948).
81. Flatt v. Barbers' Union, 202 Tenn. 345, 304 S.W.2d 329 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 904
(1957) (picketing contrary to right-to-work statute).
82. Boyce v. Lambert, 32 Lab. Cas. 70,719 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1957).
83. Local 429, Int'l Bhd. of Electrical Workers v. Farnsworth & Chambers Co., 353 U.S. 969,
rev'per curiam, 201 Tenn. 329, 299 S.W.2d 8 (1957).
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ley Act.84 Finally, in a 1979 decision, a Tennessee appellate court held that
stranger picketing that trespassed on a shopping center was enjoinable
notwithstanding the preemption doctrine.
8 5
Texas. The Texas courts' approach to picketing was similar to that of the
Tennessee courts. While holding peaceful picketing by or on behalf of em-
ployees privileged,8 6 the Texas courts consistently ruled against stranger pick-
eting, unless charges of such picketing were not adequately proved.87 As early
as 1918, in the Webb case,8 8 a Texas appellate court affirmed an injunction
against stranger picketing for recognition when the employer got along well
with its employees and apparently paid them satisfactory wages. This position
was maintained over the years, especially when the picketing union had been
rejected by the employees in secret-ballot elections,89 until the United States
Supreme Court made it clear in the preemption cases that it did not wish to
have the national labor policy against such union coercion enforced.90 The
Texas Supreme Court then abandoned its stand against stranger picketing,
even when obviously designed to force employees to accept union representa-
tion that they did not desire.91
It would be incorrect to infer from the relatively strong stand taken by the
Texas courts against stranger picketing that they were hard on picketing and
on unions generally. On the contrary, the Texas Supreme Court demonstrated
considerable solicitude for the right to picket when the picketing was done by
employees. Indeed, in Operating Engineers v. Cox,92 it held unconstitutional a
84. 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1976). Cf. Pruitt v. Lambert, 201 Tenn. 291, 298 S.W.2d 795 (1957)
(picketing enjoined).
85. Wiggins & Co. v. Retail Clerks Local 1557, 85 Lab. Cas. 1 11220 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979).
86. San Angelo v. Meat Cutters Local 103, 139 S.W.2d 843 (Tex. Civ. A pp. 1940); Henke &
Pillot, Inc. v. Meat Cutters Local 408, 109 S.W.2d 1083 (Tex Civ. App. 1937).
87. The Fair, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 131, 157 S.W.2d 716 (rex. Civ. App. 1941); Tipton
v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Local 808, 149 S.W.2d 1028 (rex. Civ. App. 1941).
88. Webb v. Cooks' Local 748, 205 S.W. 465, 466 (Tex Civ. App. 1918) (said to be the first
picketing case to reach a Texas appellate court).
89. See Dallas Gen. Drivers' Local 745 v. Oak Cliff Baking Co., 203 S.W.2d 586 (rex. Civ.
App. 1947) (union had been rejected 14-6 in one election and unanimously in another, and em-
ployer had no objection to the employees belonging to the union). See also Machinists Local 1488
v. Federated Ass'n of Accessory Workers, 133 Tex. 624, 130 S.W.2d 282 (1939) (vacating injunc-
tion as moot on motion of successful plaintiff in another case of rival unions and picketing by a
union that represented so small a number of employees that the NLRB denied an election peti-
tion); Texas Motion Picture and Vitaphone Operators Local 56, 880 v. Galveston Motion Picture
Operators Local 305, 132 S.W.2d 299 (rex. Civ. App. 1939) (stranger picketing by union of black
workers for jobs held by white members of another local); Culinary Workers' Local 331 v. Fuller,
105 S.W.2d 295, 295 (rex. Civ. App. 1937) (union seeking recognition apparently represented
none of the employees, who were being paid above scale).
90. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959); Garner v. Team-
sters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
91. Exparte Twedell, 158 Tex. 214, 309 S.W.2d 834 (1958) (reversing a contempt conviction
for violation of an injunction against picketing by a union that admittedly represented none of the
employees of the picketed employer and that declared that it would not accept recognition by the
employer, even if offered, until the employees "voluntarily" chose the union as its representative;
id at 216-17, 309 S.W.2d at 836-37).
92. 148 Tex. 42, 219 S.W.2d 787 (1949).
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statute that identified minority picketing with secondary boycotts in a way that
would make it unlawful and enjoinable.
Virginia. The course of the picketing decisions in Virginia ran a little
differently. An early case established that the Virginia courts should not en-
join peaceful organizing, strikes, or picketing by employees.93 Moreover, pos-
sibly under the influence of the free speech doctrine, the Virginia Supreme
Court in 1950 held unconstitutional a Virginia statute prohibiting all picketing
by nonemployees. 94 But a similar statute, worded more narrowly, was upheld
a few years later.95 Meanwhile, the court had held that peaceful stranger pick-
eting was privileged. 96 But later it held that stranger picketing designed to
achieve a closed or union shop in violation of the state right-to-work law was
enjoinable, a decision affirmed by the United States Supreme Court.
97 Still
later, the Virginia courts learned that what they were allowed to do under the
free speech doctrine they were prevented from doing under the preemption
doctrine.
98
Conclusion. Charges ofjudicial antiunionism as the reason for the lack of
unionization in the South are unpersuasive in light of the attitude of the courts
toward picketing. Even in Alabama peaceable "primary" picketing was privi-
leged except when a statute forbade it. Elsewhere it was fully privileged.
Stranger picketing was prohibited in Florida, Tennessee, Texas, and probably
in Louisiana, but permitted in Alabama (at common law), Georgia, Virginia,
and probably in North Carolina. Reference to Table 2 will show that there is
no apparent correlation between the legality of stranger picketing and the ex-
tent of union organization. In North Carolina, the least organized state, stran-
ger picketing was probably lawful. In Tennessee, one of the most extensively
organized states, it was unlawful. These figures seem to prove that unions do
best when denied one of their most coercive organizing devices.
93. Waddey Co. v. Richmond Typographical Union Local 90, 105 Va. 188, 53 S.E. 273
(1906).
94. Edwards v. Commonwealth, 191 Va. 272, 60 S.E.2d 916 (1950).
95. Dougherty v. Commonwealth, 199 Va. 515, 100 S.E.2d 754 (1957). Although the pickets
were not employees of the picketed employer, they were officers of the union whose members were
lawfully striking at the time. The Virginia Supreme Court thought that in such a case its jurisdic-
tion was not preempted, but one may doubt whether the decision would pass muster with the U.S.
Supreme Court that decided San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
See note 38 supra.
96. Painters Local 1018 v. Rountree Corp., 194 Va. 148, 72 S.E.2d 402 (1952) (vacating a
temporary injunction for failure of proof that the picketing was aimed at a violation of the right-
to-work law).
97. Local 10, United Ass'n of Journeyman Plumbers, v. Graham, 345 U.S. 192 (1953).
98. Waxman v. Commonwealth, 371 U.S. 4 (1962), re'gper cur/am, 203 Va. 257, 123 S.E.2d
381 (1962). The status of Ball v. Columbia Typographical Union Local 101, 37 Lab. Cas. 65705
(Va. C.C. 1959) (stranger picketing by a union not in compliance with the filing and affidavit
requirements of the NLRA held not preempted and hence enjoinable), must be regarded as ques-
tionable.
[Vol. 59
BOYCOTTS IN THE SO UTHERV COURTS
TABLE 2
LEGAL STATUS OF PEACEABLE PRIMARY*
PICKETING AT COMMON LAW AND
UNION MEMBERSHIP IN THE





PICKETING BY PICKETING BY UNIONS
STATE EMPLOYEES STRANGERS 1964 1970 1978
All States 29.5 30.8 26.9
Ala. Lawful Lawful 18.7 20.2 19.2
Ark No common-law decisions No common-law decisions 17.0 17.7 15.0
Fla. Lawful Unlawful 14.0 13.9 11.7
Ga. Lawful Lawful 14.0 16.1 13.6
La. Probably lawful Probably unlawful 18.7 18.7 16.0
Miss. No common-law decisions No common-law decisions 13.5 13.2 12.7
N.C. Lawful Probably lawful 7.4 7.7 6.5
S.C. No common-law decisions No common-law decisions 7.4 9.6 6.7
Tenn. Lawful Unlawful 19.2 20.6 17.7
Tex. Lawful Unlawful 14.1 14.4 11.0
Va. Lawful Lawful 15.8 16.1 12.7
* In accordance with present practice, the term "primary" is used here in a locational, not
a legal-relational, sense. Picketing is primary in this sense when restricted to the premises of the
employer with whom the union's original dispute occurred. The untoward consequences of this
confusion of legal and spatial categories become apparent when numerous employers share com-
mon physical premises. For some sense of the consequent legal breakdown into such absurdities
as the "common situs" and "roving situs" doctrines-both granting unions special privileges to
evade the federal law against secondary boycotts-see the cases and other references in notes 14-
15 supra.
Source: Figures for 1964 are from U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEPT. OF LA-
BOR, DIRECTORY OF NAT'L UNIONS AND EMPLOYEE As. 64 (1967). The other figures are from
unpublished data supplied by Mr. Eugene Becker of the Division of Industrial Relations of the
Bureau of Labor Statistics.
V. CONVENTIONAL SECONDARY BOYCOTTS INDUCED BY UNIONS
We have seen that under any consistent theory of legal relations, most
types of concerted union activity should be called either secondary boycotts or
secondary boycott inducements.9 9 Only a strike called by a union against an
employer to express dissatisfaction with the terms and conditions of employ-
ment offered by the employer to ther strikers themselves with no deliberate
intent to injure third parties, is primary action in this plain and rigorous sense.
If employees strike an employer, not exclusively over terms and conditions of
mutual and reciprocal interest, but over relations between the employer and
other persons, whether employers, employees, or consumers, then the strike
becomes secondary.
99. See Part II supra.
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If in connection with a primary strike the strikers set up a picket line or
any other device intended to affect relations between the employer and third
parties, that picket line or other device, though localized at the strike scene, is,
nevertheless, secondary in the sense of legal relations though it may be "pri-
mary" in the geographical sense. Designed to affect relations between the em-
ployer and others, it is no different from any other "secondary boycott,"
regardless of its location.
These matters of definition, which today remain in an even less satisfac-
tory state than seventy or eighty years ago,1°° figured largely in the pre-New
Deal common-law labor cases, both North and South, with which we are con-
cerned. The cases will demonstrate that even some strikes against employers
over the economic terms applicable to the strikers themselves might become
secondary boycotts, depending upon how the strikes were brought about.
Therefore, the secondary boycott may actually be a far more dominant means
of union self-advancement than anyone has hitherto thought.
Disturbed by this insight, unions and their sympathizers have expended
considerable effort in an attempt to prove that almost none of the union de-
vices of coercive self-aggrandizement are "secondary boycotts." In one of
their more disturbing arguments, they take the position that no action
designed to prevent third parties from mitigating the disruptive effects of the
union's direct action against the "primary" employer should be called "secon-
dary".' 01 For example, if a union struck an employer for higher wages, and
the employer sent to another firm some of the work that the strike was halting,
under this theory the union would be engaging in privileged "primary" action
if it struck, picketed, or otherwise boycotted the second employer.'
0 2
The necessary implication of this argument is that the test of whether
conduct is "secondary" should have nothing to do with the way in which rela-
tional pressures are brought to bear on union-management disputes. The test
becomes instead whether or not the union's pressures on third parties help it to
completely shut down the operations of the so-called "primary" employer-a
dubious position that amounts to elevating union interests above all other in-
terests and the rights of union leaders over all other rights, whether of consum-
ers, of investors, or of competing workers. The premise is that monopolistic
union controls, not competitive markets, should determine labor costs. Thus,
if a union calls an unsuccessful strike against an employer, and the employer is
able to carry on production, under this theory unions are privileged to "follow
the product" and picket at all distribution points, no matter how much they
embarrass operations there, provided the picketing is confined to the offending
100. See, e.g., Cox, The Landrum-Griffm Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, 44
MINN. L. REv. 257, 271 (1959); Lesnick, The Gravamen of the Secondary Boycott, 62 COLUM. L.
REv. 1363, 1415-30 (1962). See also authorities cited in notes 14-15 supra.
101. Lesnick, supra note 100, at 1420-30.
102. Id
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product. 103
This study is not designed to provide a complete account of the current
law of "secondary boycotts." The success of the "primary-secondary" dichot-
omy excogitated by unionists and academic writers has proliferated the law to
such complexity that nothing less than a multi-volume work would suffice to
that end. Our object here is to show what the southern courts did with secon-
dary boycotts until the time when the Supreme Court ordered them out of the
labor law field and when, with some slight murmurs of indignation, they qui-
etly accepted the eviction. Although the comparison is especially difficult in
this complicated field of law, we also try to evaluate the southern decisions in
the light of the leading northern approaches to the secondary boycott. How-
ever, we will first examine the inner workings of secondary boycotts, for with-
out a grasp of these workings it is impossible to appreciate just how coercive
secondary boycotts are and why courts and legislatures have persistently
tended to find them tortious and prohibit them. We then deal with the main
forensic devices for transforming actionable secondary boycotts into privileged
"primary" action: the "common situs" picketing of the construction unions;
the "roving situs" picketing and "hot-cargo contracts" of the Teamsters
Union; and finally the "allowable area of economic conffict" and "unity of
interest" doctrines.
A. The Basic Mechanism: Coercion
Nothing was more common in the old decisions against secondary boy-
cotts than the tendency of the courts to refer to them as "coercive." Scarcely a
ruling against them failed to mention their "coercive" nature. In most cases
the courts probably were thinking of the coercion addressed to "T," the middle
party in the pattern D---T--->P. Typically, the defendant union would threaten
to strike, picket, or boycott T unless he quit dealing with P, the person or firm
with whom the union was ultimately disputing. Very little attention, however,
was paid, at least in the opinions, to the devices used by the union to bring
pressure to bear on T.
Consider the rather remarkable fact that a single picket at a construction
project containing hundreds of employees, engaged by perhaps a dozen sepa-
rate subcontractors, could and often did bring all construction to a halt. t°4 In
observing this phenomenon one must not fall victim to the fallacy that work-
ers, even union workers, are automatons who lay down their tools and leave
the premises whenever they see a picket sign or receive orders from the walk-
ing delegate. On the contrary, wage workers are as independent and as varied
as any other group. Something more than a mere request to quit work, when
103. See section V. D., infra.
104. See, e.g., Local 438, Constr. & Gen. Laborers' Union, v. Curry, 371 U.S. 542 (1963), rev'g
onpreemption grounds (slowed construction) 217 Ga. 512, 123 S.E.2d 653 (1962); Cain, Brogden &
Cain, Inc. v. Teamsters Local 47, 155 Tex. 304, 285 S.W.2d 942 (1956) (slowed construction).
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they have no grievance against their employer, is necessary to induce them to
leave their job and sustain the accompanying loss of pay.105 This "something
else" that makes secondary boycotts even more secondary and more coercive
than they usually are thought to be is the power exercised by union officials,
sometimes authorized by union bylaws, to fine or expel, and thus to keep out
of the relevant trade permanently, any member who refuses to walk out when
directed to do so in a secondary-boycott situation.
10 6
Judges from an early date were aware that secondary strikes and strike-
threats were even more secondary and more coercive than they seemed to be
on their face. In the celebrated case of Temperton v. Russell,107 the English
Judge Lopes rejected the idea that secondary strikes should be held privileged
as manifestations of the personal freedom of the secondary strikers. Contrary
to the unions' contentions, he said, the workers themselves were compelled to
strike in order to escape the unions' reprisals:
It was contended that the damage to the plaintiff must be con-
sidered as having arisen from the spontaneous action of the individ-
ual workmen themselves. I cannot think that that view is
maintainable. We know something of the action of trade unions and
their officials. So far from the injury to the plaintiff arising from the
105. A great many cases could be cited illustrating the difficulties unions sometimes have in
getting their members to quit working in the absence of disputes involving the immediate interests
of those workers. Union members are not always anxious to lose pay merely to advance the
monopolistic or cartel objectives of their leaders and of the business combinations whose aims
they share. See, e.g., Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Green, 210 Ala. 496, 98 So. 569
(1923), appeal dismissedper curiam, 265 U.S. 576 (1924) (member expelled for refusing to partici-
pate in wartime strike); Employing Printers' Club v. Doctor Blosser Co., 122 Ga. 509, 50 S.E. 353
(1905) (union members frustrated union-employer cartel by refusing to strike an employer who
preferred to compete); Yankee Network, Inc. v. Gibbs, 295 Mass. 561, 3 N.E.2d 228 (1936) (union
members suspended and expelled for refusing to engage in a secondary work stoppage); Cotton
Jammers & Longshoremen's Local 2 v. Taylor, 23 Tex. Civ. App. 367, 56 S.W. 553 (1900) (union
members expelled for allegedly working under scale).
106. Typically, union bylaws "require that the members... give prompt and implicit obedi-
ence to the demands of the walking delegates." National Protective Ass'n v. Cumming, 53 A.D.
227, 229, 65 N.Y.S. 946, 947 (1900), af'd, 170 N.Y. 315, 63 N.E. 369 (1902). See also Saulsberry v.
Coopers' Int'l Union, 147 Ky. 170, 172 143 S.W. 1018 (1912); Willcutt & Sons v. Bricklayers'
Benevolent & Protective Union, 200 Mass. 110, 112, 85 N.E. 897, 898 (1908). For representative
southern cases describing or containing instances of the operation of such bylaws, see Montgom-
ery Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Ledbetter Erection Co., 256 Ala. 678, 57 So. 2d 112 (1951),
cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 344 U.S. 178 (1952); Local 57, Bhd. of Painters, v. Boyd,
245 Ala. 227, 16 So. 2d 705 (1944); Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Green, 210 Ala. 496,
98 So. 569 (1923) appealdismissed, 265 U.S. 576 (1924); Love v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engi-
neers, 139 Ark. 375, 215 S.W. 602 (1919); Jetton-Dekle Lumber Co. v. Mather, 53 Fla. 969, 43 So.
590 (1907); Nyland v. Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners Local 1960, 156 La. 604, 100 So. 733
(1924); Monroe v. Colored Screwmen's Local 1, 135 La. 893, 66 So. 260 (1914); Schneider v. Local
60, Journeymen Plumbers, 116 La. 270,40 So. 700 (1905); Lundine v. McKinney, 183 S.W.2d 265
(Tex. Civ. App. 1944); Longshoremen's Ass'n Local 329 v. Williams, 102 S.W.2d 1072 (rex. Civ.
App. 1937); McCantz v. Brotherhood of Painters, 13 S.W.2d 902 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929); Cotton
Jammers & Longshoremen's Local 2 v. Taylor, 23 Tex. Civ. App. 367, 56 S.W. 553 (1900). I tried
in an article some years ago to show that the way unions conduct their internal affairs has a
considerable impact on the public interest. See Petro, External Significance of Internal Union Af-
fairs, 4 N.Y.U. ANN. CONF. ON LABOR 339 (1951).
107. [1893] 1 Q. B. 715.
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men acting of their own accord, I think it is clear that, if it had not
been for the fear of the trade unions and of the consequences of
breaking the compacts which they had entered into as members of
the union, there would have been no question of the men withdraw-
ing from their employ. I think it was shewn that Russell acted in
what he did as the delegate, and under the instructions of the joint
committee of the three trade unions .... 108
Furthermore, it was equally unconvincing to assert that there was no co-
ercion in secondary strikes because the members had voluntarily joined the
union and, therefore, had voluntarily bound themselves to strike when ordered
to do so. For in an indeterminate but certainly large number of cases, workers
had found themselves forced to join the union if they wished to continue
working.' 0
9
In a typical resolution of this issue, courts would enjoin unions from or-
dering their members to engage in secondary strikes, but would preserve the
right of the members to cease working upon their own volition.1 0 Even in
New York, with its general prounion stance and its tendency to believe that
there was nothing coercive in union fines or expulsions to implement secon-
dary boycotts, "1 injunctions in some instances prohibited unions from order-
ing their members to participate in secondary strikes.112 The Massachusetts
court, after the Martell 3 and Willcut1 4 cases, often would order unions guilty
of secondary boycotting to refrain from threatening members with fine or ex-
pulsion in order to compel them to engage in secondary-strike activity. 115 Ma-
ryland and New Jersey, while recognizing the right to discipline members for
breaking union rules and the inability of a court to compel an individual to
work, also did not hesitate to hold secondary-strike orders unlawful and en-
108. Id at 731. See also Ad at 726-27 (comments of Lord Esher, M.R.).
109. Forced unionism traces back to the earliest days. See note 18 supra. I have contended
elsewhere, with extensive documentation, that during the period of so-called "government by in-
junction" most of the labor disputes involved efforts by unions to force themselves upon unwilling
employees. See Petro, supra note 2, at 341, 390-428.
110. E.g., Alabama State Fed'n of Labor v. McAdory, 246 Ala. 1, 18 So. 2d 810 (1944), cert.
dismissed, 325 U.S. 450 (1945), (statute prohibiting single workers from refusing to handle goods
held unconstitutional, but statute prohibiting secondary strikes constitutional); Henderson v. Cole-
man, 150 Fla. 185, 7 So. 2d 117 (1942) (individual decisions to refuse to load trucks despite injunc-
tion against secondary strike held privileged, but if defendant union had ordered employees to
strike in violation of decree contempt would be found).
111. Eg., Bossert v. Dhuy, 221 N.Y. 342, 359, 117 N.E. 582, 585 (1917). See also Bohn Mfg.
Co. v. Holis, 54 Minn. 223, 232-33, 55 N.W. 1119, 1120-21 (1893).
112. Opera on Tour v. Weber, 285 N.Y. 348, 354-55, 34 N.E.2d 349, 351-52 (1941); Auburn
Draying Co. v. Wardell, 89 Misc. 501, 515-16, 152 N.Y.S. 475, 482-83 (1915), aff'd, 178 A.D. 270,
165 N.Y.S. 469 (1917), aff'd, 227 N.Y. 1, 124 N.E. 97 (1919).
113. Martell v. White, 185 Mass. 255, 69 N.E. 1085 (1904), discussed in Petro, supra note 6.
114. Willcutt & Sons v. Bricklayers' Benevolent & Protective Union, 200 Mass. 110, 119-23, 85
N.E. 897, 901-03 (1908), discussed in Petro, supra note 6. See also Boutwell v. Marr, 71 Vt. 1, 42
A. 607 (1899).
115. A.T. Stearns Lumber Co. v. Howlett, 260 Mass. 45, 157 N.E. 82 (1927), aff'd, 264 Mass.
511, 163 N.E. 193 (1928); Scully Co. v. Barry, 8 Law & Lab. 321 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1926); George
T. McLauthlin Co. v. McDonald, 4 Law & Lab. 288 (Mass. 1922).
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joinable.'1 6 The southern decisions were indistinguishable from the northern
decisions on these issues. They too never commanded an individual employee
to work. In the southern cases that we shall be covering, the court orders
against secondary strikes or strike threats were uniformly addressed to the
union officials.
B. Construction Industry Boycotts." "Common Situs"
Although it is but one of many industries in which numerous distinct em-
ployment units are found at a single site,117 the construction industry must
rank among the most notable in any account of secondary boycotts. The
building trade unions have been in the forefront of the cartel-prone unions
and among the first to pursue technologically restrictionist policies and to aim
at taking wages out of competition.' 18 Much earlier than other unions, they
brought secondary-boycott techniques of eliminating the competition of non-
union employers and employees to a high state of effectiveness."i 9
Most construction projects contain a large number of independent con-
tractors. If all are organized by A.F.L.-affiliated unions, the only "labor"
trouble likely to occur will involve jurisdictional disputes between the unions.
But if one or more of the subcontractors happens to be nonunion, there is
likely to be more serious trouble. Usually a picket line, or maybe a single
picket, announces that the electrical work, the carpentry, or the masonry, as
the case may be, is being performed by an "unfair" subcontractor. The likely
result is that the tradesmen in the affiliated unions wil quit working, so that
the owner or the general contractor on the project will be under pressure to
dispense with the services of the nonunion subcontractor. 120 Quite obviously,
116. Bricklayers' Int'l Union v. Seymour Ruff& Sons, 160 Md. 483, 154 A. 52 (1931); Alfred
W. Booth & Bros. v. Burgess, 72 N.J.Eq. 181, 183-84, 65 A. 226, 227, 232-33 (1906).
117. Others include railroad and airline terminals, seaports, office buildings, industrial parks,
and shopping centers. All have produced nurfierous cases that have been complicated unnecessa-
rily by the idea that since the "primary" employer is there, the union should have picketing privi-
leges-an argument that would disappear if all picketing were appraised for what it is, that is an
inducement to secondary boycotts.
118. For a case recounting the socially destructive monopolistic tendencies of the construction
trade unions in San Francisco, see Industrial Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 64, 72-75 (1925).
The description of the efforts of the building trades unions there would fit any large city in the
United States.
119. See National Protective Ass'n v. Cumming, 170 N.Y. 315, 63 N.E. 369 (1902) (involving
the building trades), discussed in Petro, supra note 6, at IVB. See also Lohse Patent Door Co. v.
Fuelle, 215 Mo. 421, 114 S.W. 997 (1908) (featuring a comprehensive summary of the restrictive
practices of the building trades' unions and a successful complaint against a broad attack on non-
union building products).
120. For a typical contemporary example, see NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Coun-
cil, 341 U.S. 675 (1951), indicating how the Taft-Hartley Act dealt with construction industry
boycotts. Much has happened in this field of law since the Denver case, so it gives no more than
an indication.
Picketing construction projects is not the only means by which the building trades achieve
coercive monopolies. They also, along with the Teamsters, make considerable use of "hot-cargo"
contracts, which provide that the contracting employer will not use proscribed materials or deal
with nonunion contractors. For a leading ease, see National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB,
386 U.S. 612 (1967), reviewed in Petro, supra note 15, at 335-48.
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in spite of the "geographical primariness" of this picketing, it is an inducement
to secondary strikes and to secondary boycotts-secondary strikes by the
members of the affiliated trades and consequent boycotts of the offending sub-
contractor by the owner of the project and the general contractor, not because
of any dissatisfaction with its work, but because its employees do not belong,
do not choose to belong, or are not permitted to belong to the aggressor union.
During the common-law period relevant to our discussion,:the courts
across the nation generally split between the "liberal" New York approach,
which held construction industry boycotts privileged;' 2' and the "conserva-
tive" Massachusetts approach, which usually held them actionable and enjoin-
able because they were contrary to the public good, which is served by
competitive industry and harmed by the kind of monopolies that the building
trades unions have always aimed to establish.' 2 2 Here again we are in for a
surprise when we observe what the southern states did with secondary con-
struction site boycotts. Not all of the southern states have reported decisions
on these boycotts, but of those that do, most found them privileged. Thus:
Alabama. Strictly speaking, Alabama had no common-law decision on
the legality of construction site boycotts. But in a case in which it declared
that it could see nothing wrong in refusals to work on nonunion products, the
Alabama Supreme Court struck down a statute prohibiting strikes against
nonunion products. 123 In the only other case worth noting, the Alabama court
enjoined a construction industry boycott, but only because the court thought
that it violated the Taft-Hartley Act and not because it violated Alabama
law. 124
Arkansas. There was only one relevant case in Arkansas, but in it the
Arkansas Supreme Court forcefully held privileged a typical construction in-
dustry secondary strike and boycott against nonunion subcontractors and
products.'2 5 Apparently, from an early date, Arkansas authorities took sides
with unions against employers. 1
26
Florida. At least in the beginning, Florida too found secondary strikes on
121. Eg., Bossert v. Dhuy, 221 N.Y. 342, 117 N.E. 582 (1917).
122. E.g., A.T. Stearns Lumber Co. v. Howlett, 260 Mass. 45, 157 N.E. 82 (1927), aff'd, 264
Mass. 511, 163 N.E. 193 (1928); Aberthaw Constr. Co. v. Cameron, 194 Mass. 208, 80 N.E. 478
(1907).
123. Alabama State Fed'n of Labor v. McAdory, 246 Ala. 1, 18 So. 2d 810 (1944), cert. dis-
missed, 325 U.S. 450 (1945).
124. Montgomery Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Ledbetter Erection Co., 256 Ala. 678, 57
So. 2d 112 (1951), cert. dismissed as impro vidently granted, 344 U.S. 178 (1952) (no final order in
Alabama courts, only affirmance of a temporary injunction).
125.. Meier v. Speer, 96 Ark. 618, 132 S.W. 988 (1910).
126. Cf. State v. Kansas & Texas Coal Co., 96 F. 353 (W.D. Ark. 1899), rev'don other grounds,
183 U.S. 185 (1901) (dissolving an Arkansas state-court injunction granted to Arkansas officials
against an employer, prohibiting it from transporting striker replacements across state line).
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construction projects privileged on absolute-rights grounds.' 27 Later, how-
ever, it held that construction-site picketing for the closed shop violated right-
to-work provisions of the Florida statutes and Constitution.' 28
Georgia. There were no common-law decisions in Georgia on construc-
tion industry strikes and boycotts. A Georgia injunction against picketing for
the closed shop in violation of the state fight-to-work law was reversed on
preemption grounds by the United States Supreme Court.' 29
Mississippi. In the only relevant Mississippi case, construction-site picket-
ing, designed to compel a general contractor to sign with the unions, induced
the employees of the unionized plumbing subcontractor, the plaintiff, to go on
strike in violation of a no-strike agreement. Plaintiff charged the unions with
violation of the state right-to-work law. Dismissing the action, the Mississippi
Supreme Court held that the United States Supreme Court was not permitting
the states to enforce their right-to-work laws in any effective way. Moreover,
relief could not be based on the picketing-induced violation of the plumbers'
no-strike contract because neither the contract nor the breach had been
pleaded.
130
North Carolina and South Carolina. State v. Van Pelt,13 ' which we have
encountered previously, 132 is the only common-law case in North Carolina on
construction industry boycotts. In Van Pelt threats to refuse to work on con-
struction jobs that used the offending employer's lumber products were held
privileged against criminal conspiracy charges. Subsequent North Carolina
decisions involving the construction industry arose out of the state right-to-
work laws, 133 as did the only relevant South Carolina decision. 134
Tennessee. We have dealt elsewhere with the Tennessee construction in-
dustry decisions involving the state right-to-work law. 13 In the only case of
note a mason's union, acting as enforcer for a cartel of mason contractors,
refused to supply labor to the plaintiff because the cartel mistakenly believed
that the plaintiff had violated its bidding restrictions. 13 6 As the court put it,
127. Jetton-Dekle Lumber Co. v. Mather, 53 Fla. 969, 43 So. 590 (1907).
128. Local 519, Plumbers & Pipefitters' v. Robertson, 44 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 1950).
129. Curry v. Construction & Gen. Laborers' Local 438, 217 Ga. 512, 123 S.E.2d 653 (1962),
rep'd, 371 U.S. 542 (1963).
130. Hattiesburg Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mississippi Mechanical Contractors, 207
So. 2d 99 (Miss. 1968).
131. 136 N.C. 633, 49 S.E. 177 (1904).
132. See text accompanying note 31 supra.
133. Poole & Kent Corp. v. C.E. Thurston & Sons, Inc. 286 N.C. 121, 209 S.E.2d 450 (1974);
Beaty v. Asbestos Workers, 248 N.C. 170, 102 S.E.2d 763 (1958); Jones Constr. Co. v. Local 755,
IBEW, 246 N.C. 481, 98 S.E.2d 852 (1957).
134. Gregory Elec. Co. v. Custodis Constr. Co., 312 F. Supp. 300, (D.S.C. 1970).
135. See notes 82-84 and accompanying text supra.
136. Lichter v. Fulcher, 22 Tenn. App. 670, 125 S.W.2d 501 (1939).
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"the only offense of which complainants were guilty... was that of obtaining
the low bid on tile and brick work in Nashville."' 137 The court affirmed an
award of compensatory and punitive damages.
Texas. The Cain case 138 was the only clear common-law decision on
construction industry boycotts in Texas, although there were many cases con-
struing statutes. 139 In Cain a single picket at a large shopping center construc-
tion site brought all work to a halt. The object seemed to be to induce the
plaintiff-general contractor to break its contract with a nonunion subcontrac-
tor. The court could not hold the picketing a violation of the state statute
prohibiting secondary boycotts because it earlier had held that statute uncon-
stitutional; 140 nor could it hold the picketing a violation of the state right-to-
work law because that statute had not been pleaded. But it could and did hold
that the picketing was a deliberate infliction of harm without justification and,
therefore, actionable and enjoinable at common law.' 41 Objections based on
preemption grounds were rejected because the NLRB had refused to prosecute
despite the clear violation of the NLRA that was involved and the devastating
effect of the boycott. Furthermore, after a thorough review of the cases, the
Texas Supreme Court ruled that the right of free speech did not apply to pick-
eting designed to induce a secondary boycott.142
Virginia. There were no "common-situs" or construction industry boycott
cases in Virginia until well after the Taft-Hartley Act and the state right-to-
work law were passed. In one case the United States Supreme Court upheld
over free speech objections Virginia's authority to enjoin construction-site
picketing in violation of its right-to-work law.143 In another, the Supreme
Court upheld over preemption contentions Virginia's authority to prevent the
137. Id. at 678, 125 S.W.2d at 506.
138. Cain, Brogden & Cain, Inc. v. Teamsters Local 47, 155 Tex. 304, 285 S.W.2d 942 (1956).
Cf. Carpenters Local 2484 v. Rust, 433 S.W.2d 683 (Tex. 1968), (a dubious decision vacating an
injunction against construction-site picketing inducing breach of contract because there was a
failure of proof. In dissent Judge Griffin pointed out that plaintiff offered no proof because de-
fendant's pleading and proof established the point in question, id. at 687 (Griffin, J., dissenting)).
139. See, e.gl., Exparle Dilley, Zea and Cooper, 160 Tex. 522, 334 S.W.2d 425 (1960) (con-
struction site picketing held a violation of the Texas antitrust law, but contempt judgment against
defendant vacated on preemption grounds); Texas State Fed'n of Labor v. Brown & Root, Inc.,
246 S.W.2d 938 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) (combination of 56 unions, a number of trade councils, and
city officials to force unionization on an employer and employees who wanted no part of the
construction trades unions; fragmentary relief granted against violation of Texas right-to-work
law and other statutes); Construction & Gen. Labor Local 688 v. Stephenson,148 Tex. 434, 225
S.W.2d 958 (1950) (picketing to compel a house-moving firm to accept the closed shop held a
violation of the state right-to-work law but not of the Texas secondary boycott statute declared
unconstitutional because it prohibited picketing by minority or stranger unions).
140. Construction & Gen. Labor Union Local 688 v. Stephenson, 148 Tex. 434, 225 S.W.2d
958 (1950).
141. The court pointed out that on the one hand the plaintiff had no dispute with his own
employees, and on the other he had no control over the labor policies of the offending subcontrac-
tor. 155 Tex. at 310-11, 285 S.W.2d at 946-47.
142. Id. at 312, 285 S.W.2d at 947.
143. Local 10, United Ass'n of Journeymen Plumbers v. Graham, 345 U.S. 192 (1953).
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United Mine Workers from using outrageous violence to supplant members of
A.F.L. unions on a construction project.'" Justice Douglas dissented in part
on the ground that "this conduct is the stuff out of which labor-management
strife has been made, ever since trade unionism began its growth.' 45 The
same reasoning generally applied would establish prescriptive rights in law-
breaking.
TABLE 3
LEGAL STATUS OF "COMMON-SITUS"
CONSTRUCTION-INDUSTRY BOYCOTTS
AT COMMON LAW AND UNION






STATE UNLAWFUL (U) 1964 1970 1978
ALL STATES 29.5 30.8 26.9
Ala. L 18.7 20.2 19.2
Ark. L' 17.0 17.7 15.0
Fla. L 14.0 13.9 11.7
Ga. No common-law decisions 14.0 16.1 13.6
La. No common-law decisions 18.7 18.7 16.0
Miss. No common-law decisions 13.5 13.2 12.7
N.C. L 7.4 7.7 6.5
S.C. No common-law decisions 7.4 9.6 6.7
Tenn. U 19.2 20.6 17.7
Tex. U 14.1 14.4 11.0
Va. No common-law decisions but probably U** 15.8 16.1 12.7
* Source: Figures for 1964 are from U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEPT. OF
LABOR, DIRECTORY OF NAT'L UNIONS AND EMPLOYEE ASSOCIATIONS 64 (1967). The other
figures are from unpublished data supplied by Mr. Eugene Becker of the Division of Industrial
Relations of the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
** Since Virginia held secondary boycotts generally to be criminal conspiracies in Crump v.
Commonwealth, 84 Va. 927, 6 S.E. 620 (1888), it may be assumed that construction site secondary
boycotts would be considered unlawful.
C Trucking Industry Boycotts: 'Roving Situs," 'ot-Cargo," and
Preemption
Just as the work of contractors in the construction industry causes them to
move from place to place, so too does the work of trucking companies. They
have home terminals, just as contractors have offices; but a union picketing a
home terminal, just as one picketing a contractor's office, is not likely to create
the secondary boycott pressures that unions seek to bring about in order to
144. United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
145. Id. at 670 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
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force themselves upon unwilling employers and employees. After all, the em-
ployees at the home terminal already know of the dispute and may have re-
jected the union. Hence, in the trucking industry, as in the construction
industry, the unions send their pickets to the places where they can invoke
maximum coercive pressures on third parties. The construction unions
achieve the coercive maximum at construction sites. The trucking unions, and
mainly the Teamsters Union, achieve it by picketing at shipping customers'
terminals and at loading docks where trucking companies make pickups and
deliveries.
Again as unions do in the construction industry, the Teamsters Union
avails itself of the anticipatory type of secondary boycott known as the "hot-
cargo" contract. Trucking companies organized by the Teamsters "agree" in
advance-usually under threat of strike-to refuse to interline freight with
trucking companies that resist the Teamsters. Since no trucking company
whose employees wish to have representation can effectively refuse to recog-
nize the Teamsters (the NLRB will force it to recognize and bargain), hot-
cargo contracts compel trucking companies to participate with the Teamsters
in the illegal activity of coercing employers to recognize the union despite the
unwillingness of the employees themselves.' 46 No hot-cargo agreement pro-
vides for boycotting only those firms that have flouted the wishes of their em-
ployees to be represented by the Teamsters. Rather, it provides for boycotting
any firm no matter who resists the union, the employer, or the employees.
As previously mentioned,147 the Supreme Court of the United States held
that the NLRB was without authority to prevent the Teamsters from forcing
itself upon unwilling employers and employees in this way.148 It also held that
under the preemption doctrine the state courts had no authority under state
statutes or the common law to prevent this travesty of the national policy of
free employee choice. 14 9 Thus, although the Teamsters' monopolistic boycott-
ing techniques violated the common law, state statutes, and the NLRA in sev-
eral ways, decisions of the United States Supreme Court insured that this most
powerful and arrogant of all unions would have nothing standing in the way
of its intention to control "everything on wheels," least of all the choices of
individual employees or the wishes of consumers for cheap motor transport.
This is why there are relatively few cases to report in this section. The state
courts were compelled to act warily in view of the Supreme Court's exculpa-
146. A summary of the relevant law under the NLRA, as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme
Court, is found in note 38 supra. See Ladies' Garment Workers Union v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731
(1961) (both union and employer violated NLRA when union was recognized without establishing
that it was choice of majority of employees).
147. See note 38 supra.
148. NLRB v. Local 639, It'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 362 U.S. 274 (1960); note 38 supra. The
1959 amendments of the NLRA made stranger picketing for recognition an unfair labor practice,
see 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b) (7) (1976), thus cancelling the effect of this case.
149. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
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tory doctrines. There is no point in attempting to line up the cases. They are
too few and too various to produce any kind of a meaningful pattern.
Georgia. Impelled by the United States Supreme Court's protection of
picketing under the free speech doctrine, the Georgia Supreme Court held in
1942 that Teamster picketing was privileged whether confined to the primary
employer's premises or extended to other sites.'50
Mississippi. This state had no "roving-situs" Teamster cases, but there
was a comparable one involving building trades unions.' 5 ' An employer and
his employees joined together as plaintiffs when construction unions picketed
a plant where they were at work and endangered their jobs. The unions pick-
eted at gates used by all the plant's regular employees, rather than the one
used by the plaintiffs, in order to bring about maximum disruption against the
party in the middle ("T") and thus maximum pressure against the plaintiffs.
This was not a case of unions defending exploited employees against an abu-
sive employer. Rather, the lower court found that the plaintiff-employer oper-
ated on nondiscriminatory open shop principles, that some of its employees
were union members, that relations among them were excellent, that the em-
ployees no more wanted union representation than the employer did, and that
the picketing unions were plainly out to achieve a hiring monopoly in viola-
tion of the state right-to-work law.'5 2 The Mississippi Supreme Court, up-
holding an injunction against the picketing, acted consistently with section
14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act, which explicitly provided that state right-to-
work laws were not preempted. In a performance that must be called ex-
traordinary for even the Warren Court, the Supreme Court reversed the Mis-
sissippi decision, finding that it was based on the mistaken belief that the case
was not governed by the NLRA because of inadequate interstate com-
merce.' 5 3 This ground of decision is found nowhere in the opinion of the
Mississippi Supreme Court.
154
Tennessee. Like other state courts, the Tennessee Supreme Court learned
that the United States Supreme Court was not going to tolerate any obstruc-
tion by the states of the aspirations of the unions for a monopoly of the labor
supply in their respective "jurisdictions." With the state courts preempted
from enjoining secondary "roving" picketing, regardless of its coercive effect,
the Tennessee Supreme Court thought it proper to permit the victim of a
150. Mason & Dixon Lines, Inc. v. Odom, 193 Ga. 471, 18 S.E.2d 841 (1942).
151. Hattiesburg Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Broome, 247 Miss. 458, 153 So. 2d 695
(1963), rev'd, 377 U.S. 126 (1964).
152. Id. at 472, 153 So. 2d at 701.
153. 377 U.S. 126, 127 (1964).
154. The Court was afraid to hold that picketing for the closed shop was preempted because
§ 14(b) quite clearly intended the precise opposite. Hence it grabbed for this alternate ground of
disposition.
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Teamsters picket line to enjoin common carriers from refusing to cross the
picket line (not the union for establishing it).15 After all, it is the legal duty of
common carriers to serve all customers without distinction. Why should there
be discrimination merely because a customer was being picketed? Within a
year the Supreme Court set the Tennessee court straight, holding that the legal
duties of common carriers provide no ground for avoiding the impact of the
preemption doctrine.'
5 6
Texas. The same story was repeated in Texas. Before the Supreme Court
created the labor law preemption doctrine, the Texas courts had been consist-
ently enjoining hot-cargo operations and roving picketing of a clearly secon-
dary variety,' 5 7 although it was holding picketing primary, and hence
privileged, when it moved slightly away from a struck plant to the point where
a railroad entered the plant,158 or when in a dispute with a trucker the union
picketed its main customer.
159
Once the Supreme Court showed in its Garner ' 60 decision that Teamster
picketing was immune to state controls, even when plainly designed to defeat
the national labor policy of free employee choice, the Texas Supreme Court
followed suit and added some flourishes of its own. In the Whioield case,
16 1
155. Aladdin Indus. v. Associated Trans., Inc., 45 Tenn. App. 329, 323 S.W.2d 222 (1958).
Compare General Drivers Local 89 v. American Tobacco Co., 348 U.S. 978 (1955), rev'g, 264
S.W.2d 250 (Ky. 1954) (a case that should have warned the Tennessee court).
156. Kerrigan Iron Works, Inc. v. Cook Truck Lines, Inc., 41 Tenn. App., 296 S.W.2d 379
(1956), rev'dsub. nom. Teamsters Local 327 v. Kerrigan Iron Works, Inc., 353 U.S. 968 (1957). In
National Car Loading Corp. v. Arkansas Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 201 Tenn. 259, 298 S.W.2d
720 (1957), the Tennessee court tried to cope with the Teamsters by denying it intervention rights
in these cases, but Kerrigan also ended that possibility.
157. Dallas Gen. Drivers v. Waimix, Inc., 156 Tex. 408, 295 S.W.2d 873 (1956) (roving-situs
picketing of transit-mix trucks at construction site held a secondary boycott actionable at common
aw, especially since plaintiff had five plants that the union could have picketed [but obviously
without the coercive effect of the construction site picketing]); North East Texas Motor Lines, Inc.
v. Dickson, 148 Tex. 35, 219 S.W.2d 795 (1949) (roving-situs picketing and hot-cargo operations
enjoined; also "primary" picketing of plaintif's terminal when it appeared that the Teamsters had
confronted the plaintiff with a "sign it or else" "negotiating" stance); General Drivers Local 745 v.
Dallas County Constr. Employers' Ass'n, 246 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) (roving-situs pick-
eting of transit-mix trucks held enjoinable on suit by customer of the transit-mix company, but
perhaps privileged "primary" action had suit been brought by the transit-mix company itself);
Turner v. Zames, 206 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947), overruled in Exparte Henry, 147 Tex.
315, 215 S.W.2d 588 (1948) (Teamsters backed up majority strike against plaintiff with roving
picketing and inducements of other truckers to boycott plaintiff- all secondary activities held
wrongful and enjoinable notwithstanding picketing-free-speech doctrine).
158. Exparte Henry, 147 Tex. 315, 215 S.W.2d 588 (1948). See also Alamo Motor Lines, Inc.
v. Teamsters Local 657, 229 S.W.2d 112 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) (strike and picketing of plaintiff
held "primary;" therefore injunction denied against both union and other firms that refused to
interline freight -with plaintiff).
159. Teamsters Local 393 v. Missouri Pac. Freight Transp. Co., 220 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1949).
160. Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485 (1953) (stranger picketing by Teamsters for
recognition as exclusive bargaining representative of employees who had rejected it, held not sub-
ject to jurisdiction of state courts). See note 38 supra.
161. Truck Drivers Local 941 v. Whitfield Transp., Inc., 154 Tex. 91, 273 S.W.2d 857 (1954).
Three years earlier, in Best Motor Lines v. Teamsters Local 745, 150 Tex. 95, 237 S.W.2d 589
(1951), the Texas Supreme Court held that the Teamsters' hot-cargo arrangements were enjoin-
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the Teamsters had been defeated 37-6 in an election conducted by the NLRB.
Nevertheless, it "informed" the trucking companies interlining freight with
plaintiff Whitfield that he was "unfair." The trucking companies immediately
refused to interline freight with Whitfield. 162 Thereupon Whitfield sued the
trucking companies, claiming that they were engaged with the union and
among themselves in a conspiracy to injure. The Teamsters, which had not
been named as a defendant, intervened, and when judgment went for the
plaintiff, the union appealed. Evidently willing to interline freight with the
plaintiff under court order, the trucking companies did not appeal.
On appeal, the Texas Supreme Court was not content to reverse simply
on preemption grounds, even though the similar Garner case already had been
handed down. Apparently failing to notice that the plaintiff had sued the
trucking companies in conspiracy, and not the Teamsters, a majority of the
Texas Supreme Court held that the Teamsters had not forced the defendants
to boycott the plaintiff; it had only informed them of its dispute with Whit-
field. Their decision to boycott Whitfield was, therefore, "voluntary," and
Whitfield had no cause of action against the defendants.' 63 The court then
held that the injunction against the employer-defendants should be vacated,
despite their failure to appeal. 64
In a trenchant dissent, Judge Smith brought out all the weaknesses, ir-
relevancies, non sequiturs, and other absurdities of the majority opinion. He
pointed out that there was no dispute between the plaintiff and its employees,
who definitively had rejected the union in a secret-ballot election; that indeed
the union never claimed a majority; that there was an obvious violation of the
Texas antitrust and secondary boycott statutes; and that never before had the
Texas court vacated an injunction against defendants who failed to appeal.165
In a field of law that may correctly lay claim to its full share of travesties,
surely the Whiofeld case deserves a prominent place.
166
Conclusion. The Supreme Court's preemption and free speech doctrines,
especially as they appear in these secondary boycott cases, emphasize that
from about 1940 onward, when the picketing-free-speech doctrine was excogi-
tated in Thornhill, there was little to choose between the southern and the
northern courts in the labor law field. Certainly on the law concerning union
aggression, the courts in the North and South were equally subject to the
Supreme Court's determination to place union action in a specially privileged
status. To conceive that southern courts were hotbeds of seething rebellion
able violations of the Texas antitrust law. Best was another case in which the Teamsters arro-
gantly ordered the plaintiff trucking firm to recognize the union without an NLRB election and to
sign the "contract" instantly.
162. 154 Tex. at 94, 273 S.W.2d at 858.
163. Id. at 101, 273 S.W.2d at 863.
164. Id. at 102, 273 S.W.2d at 863.
165. Id. at 102-09, 273 S.W.2d at 863-70 (Smith, J., dissenting).
166. For approval of the Whiofeld decision, see Jeffers, supra note 26.
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against the Supreme Court's cancellation of traditional state authority over
union action would be inaccurate. There was no such rebellion. On the
whole, the southern courts accepted the free speech and the preemption doc-
trines at least as readily as the northern courts did. The Wheld case is a
good example. We have seen others, and we shall see more.
D. The Allowable Area of Economic Conflict
The term "allowable area of economic conflict" achieved prominence as
the title of the first chapter of the influential book by Felix Frankfurter and
Nathan Greene entitled The Labor Injunction.167 Shortly after the book was
published it was cited by the New York Court of Appeals in Stillwell Theatre,
Inc. v. Kaplan,168 the first case using the term. The object of the term, along
with such other terms as "unity of interest," "allies," and "struck work," was
to suggest the extent to which unions might, in a dispute with one person or
firm, impose pressures on others. 169 Just how far a court allowed unions to
extend their harmful pressures was called the "allowable area."'
170
Those who thought that doing deliberate harm to anyone should be ac-
tionable in the absence of just cause were inclined to limit the size of the al-
lowable area considerably, especially when the union extending its harmful
pressures sought to impose itself on unwilling employers and employees.' 71 A
union actually representing the free choice of employees in any firm did not
need to harm other parties. The right to strike, a devastating weapon, would
bring any employer to heel unless it was exercised when there was great unem-
ployment creating a willing labor pool to replace the strikers. If a union called
a strike at such a time it should not be able to compound its error by harming
third parties.
On the other hand, if the union was in no position to call a strike because
the employees did not want its representation, why should it be allowed to
harm third parties in order to force itself where it was not wanted? Thus, hard
167. F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION, 1-46 (1930).
168. 259 N.Y. 405, 411, 182 N.E. 63, 65-66, cert. denied, 288 U.S. 606 (1932).
169. The idea that the New York Court of Appeals might place limits on the extent to which a
union or group of unions might force themselves upon unwilling employers and employees first
appeared in Auburn Draying Co. v. Wardell, 227 N.Y. 1, 124 N.E. 97 (1919), a case in which the
Teamsters' reacted to a refusal by the plaintiff's employees to join by getting the other unions in
Auburn, N.Y., to threaten a general strike against all who dealt with the plaintiff. For the facts,
see 89 Misc. 501, 504-05, 152 N.Y.S. 475, 476-77 (1915). Another New York landmark case was
Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 N.Y. 281, II N.E.2d 910 (1937), in which the New York Court of
Appeals held that a union unsuccessful in organizing the employees of a manufacturer could
picket the products of that manufacturer wherever they were sold at retail, no matter how much
economic harm was done to the retailer in the process. See Note, Legality of Picketing Against a
Product, 14 N.Y.U.L.Q. RPv. 83 (1936).
170. F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, supra note 167, at 24-46.
171. See, e.g., Smith, Crucialssues in Labor Litigation, 20 HARV. L. REv. 429,437-39 (1907).
Professor Smith thought that if unions were allowed to do deliberate harm to everyone who dealt
with the employer with whom the union was disputing, the "damage to [the third parties], and to
the employer ... and to the community would be excessive in proportion to the benefit to the
defendant." Id. at 438-39.
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analysis revealed no occasion in which it was desirable to permit unions to
inflict deliberate harm upon third parties. This is presumably what the propo-
nents of the Taft-Hartley Act meant when they said that they could not see
"any difference between different kinds of secondary boycotts" and, therefore,
passed a statute that outlawed them all. 172 Of course the NLRB and the
Supreme Court have made numerous exceptions to the statute passed by the
Eightieth Congress. 173 But this should not be allowed to obscure the point in
issue: in every case the union privilege of doing deliberate harm to third par-
ties rests on shaky social premises.
Not a great deal of litigation in the South addressed the question of the
allowable area of economic conflict. What there was, surprisingly enough (or
perhaps no longer surprisingly in view of what we already have seen in the
southern cases), exhibited no particularly narrow conception of the allowable
area of economic conflict. Indeed, Texas, the only state with numerous deci-
sions, conceived the allowable area rather broadly.
Florida. Two attempts by Florida courts to prevent unions from spread-
ing boycotts beyond the immediate parties came so late as to suggest that they
were influenced by Taft-Hartley boycott conceptions. In any event, the
Supreme Court reversed both decisions on preemption grounds.174
Louisiana. In the only relevant case, a Louisiana appellate court followed
the lead of the New York courts and held that drivers were privileged in a
dispute with a dairy to picket grocery stores handling the dairy's products.'
75
South Carolina. A relatively late South Carolina decision held that pick-
eting an employer's customers nationwide in a recognition dispute was wrong-
ful at common law, but it denied an injunction on federal preemption
grounds.
176
172. Senator Taft said on the floor of the Senate that: "Our committee heard evidence for
weeks and never succeeded in having anyone tell us any difference between different kinds of
secondary boycotts. So we have broadened the provision dealing with secondary boycotts as to
make them an unfair labor practice." 2 Legislative History of the Labor Management Relations
Act 1106 (1948). For a review of the legislative history of the secondary-boycott provisions of the
Taft-Hartley Act, see S. PETRO, supra note 14, at 35-49. The conception of secondary action
offered here is, I believe, identical with the one adopted by the Eightieth Congress in enacting the
Taft-Hartley Act. It makes no exception in favor of unions to the principle that no one has a
privilege to harm others without proving a superior social justification. This principle is exten-
sively discussed in the third installment of this essay. See Petro, supra note 6.
173. See authorities cited in notes 14-15 & 38 supra.
174. Brotherhood of R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 396 (1969) (holding
that the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151-188 (1976), which obviously had no preemptive
intent in the field of boycotts, nevertheless did preempt state court jurisdiction over union boy-
cotts), rev'k, 201 So. 2d 253 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Ladies' Garment Workers' Local 415 v.
Scherer & Sons, 390 U.S. 717 (1968) (picketing of plaintiffs customers preempted though in viola-
tion of Florida right-to-work law), rev'g, 188 So. 2d 380 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
175. Johnson v. Milk Drivers Local 854, 195 So. 791, 794-95 (La. Ct. App. 1940) (citing Gol-
finger v. Feintuch, 276 N.Y. 281, 11 N.E.2d 910 (1937)). See 169 supra.
176. Piedmont Shirt Co. v. Clothing Workers, 237 S.C. 13, 115 S.E.2d 499 (1960).
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Texas. The Texas courts developed a formula for the allowable area of
economic conflict that was liberal enough to satisfy even Felix Frankfurter, as
indicated by his opinion affirming the Texas decision in the Ritter's Cafe
case. 177 In Ritter's Cafe a Texas appellate court held that the Brotherhood of
Carpenters, demanding recognition from an unwilling subcontractor, could
not lawfully picket a restaurant owned by a person for whom the offending
subcontractor was doing some building. 178 On appeal to the Supreme Court,
the Frankfurter opinion for the majority held that notwithstanding the free
speech doctrine so recently enunciated in Y'ornhill,179 the Texas limitation on
picketing to the industry in which the labor dispute originated was reason-
able.
180
Other Texas decisions were more generous in terms of union privilege. A
union involved in a dispute with plaintiff-employer was held privileged to
picket at a point where a railroad entered the plaintiffs premises to make pick-
ups and deliveries, even though the object was obviously to induce the rail-
road's employees to refuse to service the plaintiff, a clear case of D--T-->P. s18
Furthermore, a union was held privileged to picket the main customer of a
trucking company that refused to grant recognition.' 8 2 And in a dispute with
one of several related family businesses a union was allowed to picket the
others. 183 The Texas Supreme Court, however, held that in a dispute with an
oil company involving its vessels, a union was not privileged to picket the
company's refining subsidiary;' 84 but this decision was reversed on preemp-
tion grounds.1
8 5
Conclusion. Here, as elsewhere, the decisions of the southern courts dis-
played no particular sternness with unions, let alone antiunion animus. On
177. Carpenters Local 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 (1942), aj'g, 149 S.W.2d 694 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1941).
178. 149 S.W.2d at 697.
179. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940), struck down as unconstitutional on itsface an
Alabama statute that prohibited all picketing without "just cause." Id. at 106.
180. 315 U.S. at 728. There were several other Texas decisions against picketing that crossed
industrial lines: Office Employees Local 129 v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 314 S.W.2d 315
(rex. Civ. App. 1958) (picketing of a utility's construction project in a dispute over a discharge);
General Drivers Local 745 v. Dallas County Constr. Employers' Ass'n, 246 S.W.2d 677 (rex. Civ.
App. 1951) (picketing of a mason subcontractor in a dispute over transit-mix truckdrivers held
enjoinable on suit by subcontractor, though perhaps not on suit by transit-mix company); Borden
Co. v. Local 133, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 152 S.W.2d 828 (rex. Civ. App. 1941) (injunction
against picketing of grocery stores in dispute with dairy denied, but injunction granted against
picketing of ice company). Carter v. Bradshaw, 138 S.W.2d 187 (rex. Civ. App. 1940) (injunction
issued when, in dispute with a building contractor, Carpenters' Union picketed a building erected
by the contractor for plaintiff-automobile dealer as latter was moving in).
181. Exparte Henry, 147 Tex. 315, 215 S.W.2d 588 (1948).
182. Teamsters Local 393 v. Missouri Pac. Freight Transp. Co., 220 S.W.2d 219 (rex. Civ.
App. 1949).
183. Texas State Optical v. Optical Workers Union, 257 S.W.2d 493 (rex. Civ. App. 1953).
184. Exparfe George, 163 Tex. 103, 358 S.W.2d 590 rev'd, 371 U.S. 72 (1962). On remand the
defendant was discharged, 364 S.W.2d 189 (rex. 1963).
185. Exparte George, 371 U.S. 72 (1962).
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the contrary, the New York influence was evident in the wide range accorded
to the "allowable area of economic conffict" and to the privilege of unions
deliberately harm third parties in the name of "primary action."
VI. BUSINESS BoycoTTs IN THE SOUTHERN COURTS
Secondary boycotts are not exclusively union measures. Indeed, in most
of the confederate states the courts were called upon to consider secondary
boycotts by businessmen before they were confronted with union boycotts.
These nonunion boycotts were all of the general type, D---T--*P, even though
the details might differ. No particularly instructive cases were found in Ala-
bama, 186 Arkansas, or Florida,' 87 but there were some in all other southern
states. In each, as the prima facie tort theory would suggest,188 business boy-
cotts were held actionable whenever intentional harm to the plaintiff appeared
and the defendant was unable to convince the court that the harm was justi-
fied. Those who charge antiunion bias in the southern courts must somehow
contend with these cases, which, for the most part, applied to business firms
and businessmen restrictions on secondary pressures at least as rigorous as
those imposed upon unions. On the dubious assumption that one can tell
whether a court is antiunion by its attitude toward secondary boycotts,189 the
southern courts would rate as both antiunion and antibusiness!
Georgia. The simplest variety of secondary boycott, and the kind that the
defendant finds most difficult to justify, is that of inducing a third party to
break a contract with the plaintiff. Shortly after the Civil War, the Georgia
Supreme Court was asked to decide whether it was actionable for a defendant
to induce a violation of an employment agreement between the plaintiff and
some former slaves. Although judgment for the plaintiff was reversed on a
damages issue, and the court was not sure that there was a valid contract be-
tween the plaintiff and his former slaves, it held that inducing the former
slaves to leave the plaintiff was actionable anyway.t90 Georgia also held that
it was wrongful for a combination of retailers to boycott wholesalers who per-
186. But the general sentiment against secondary types of coercion is evident in Abingdon
Mills v. Grogan, 167 Ala. 146, 52 So. 596 (1910) (statute prohibiting enticement of employees or
inducements to quit held applicable to mill employment) and Sparks v. McCrary, 156 Ala. 382,47
So. 332 (1908) (threatening plaintiffs customers in plaintiffs store with legal action held actiona-
ble). In Brooks v. Ingraham, 186 Ala. 106, 65 So. 138 (1914), however, the defendant was held
privileged to warn the plaintiffs customers to stay off his, the defendant's, land.
187. Chipley v. Atkinson, 23 Fla. 206, 1 So. 934 (1887), although a much-cited case, is techni-
cally inconclusive despite the strong prima facie tort language declaring it actionable to induce
breach of an at-will contract. Id. at 218-19, 1 So. at 940-41.
188. See note 16 supra.
189. This idea is what St. Antoine proposes as a touchstone, supra note 14 at 5.
190. Salter v. Howard, 43 Ga. 601 (1871). See also Kinney v. Scarbrough Co., 138 Ga. 77, 74
S.E. 772 (1912) (inducement to break employment contracts with plaintiff and to go to work for
rival firm held actionable and enjoinable). Inducing breach as a paradigmatic prima facie tort is
discussed in the third installment of this essay. See Petro, supra note 6.
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sisted in dealing with the plaintiff, a competing retailer,19 1 and for a cartel of
printers to combine with a union to oust the plaintiff, a printer who refused to
join the cartel.19 2- On the other hand, a combination to refuse to hire workers
who quit their jobs without notice was held to be justified.
193
Louisiana. Perhaps influenced by a strong Missouri opinion,19 4 the Loui-
siana Supreme Court early held that it was lawful "in itself' for a combination
of insurers to refuse to cover any steamer that employed the plaintiff as
master.195 Some forty years later, however, it held that when a company and
its foreman combined "without justifiable cause" to discharge employees who
dealt with the plaintiff, the latter had a good cause of action. 196 And similarly,
when a group of businessmen induced salesmen not to lodge at the plaintiff's
hotel, the Louisiana court upheld the plaintiff's cause of action.19 7 But an
employee's suit against a union for allegedly inducing employers to refuse to
hire him was dismissed for improper pleading.'
9 8
Mississippi. Mississippi also held secondary boycotts by businessmen ac-
tionable in the absence of good cause. Plaintiff in the Globe & Rutgers case' 99
charged some rival insurance companies with a conspiracy to induce one of its
agents to quit. Defendants allegedly sought to injure the plaintiff because of
its refusal to participate in the defendants' cartel. Had the plaintiff been ru-
ined by regular competition, said the court, there could have been no recovery;
but here there was no just cause for the deliberate injury to plaintiff and there-
fore the complaint was good.20° The earlier Louisiana and Missouri decisions,
said the court, were "out of harmony with modem decisions" that took seri-
ously the idea that there should be a remedy for every wrong.20' Similarly,
Mississippi held it actionable for an employer without just cause to discharge
191. Brown v. Jacobs Pharmacy Co., 115 Ga. 429, 41 S.E. 553 (1902).
192. Employing Printers' Club v. Doctor Blosser Co., 122 Ga. 509, 50 S.E. 353 (1905).
193. Willis v. Muscogee Mfg. Co., 120 Ga. 597, 48 S.E. 177 (1904). In a case involving no
suggestion of an employer blacklisting combination, the Georgia Supreme Court struck down a
statute requiring employers to provide any dischargee with a written explanation of the reasons
for the discharge. Wallace v. Georgia C. & N. Ry. 94 Ga. 732, 22 S.E. 579 (1894). A union
blacklist characterizing an employer as "unfair" was found to be nonlibelous in J.B. Watters &
Son v. Retail Clerks Local 479, 120 Ga. 424, 47 S.E. 911 (1904).
194. Hunt v. Simonds, 19 Mo. 583 (1854). The court said that the defendants in this case had
an absolute right to refuse to insure the plaintiffs vessel, but it might equally have held that the
risks implicit in the casualty insurance business constitute a sufficient justification for refusals to
insure.
195. Orr v. Home Mut. Ins. Co., 12 La. Ann. 255 (1857). See note 194 Supra.
196. Graham v. St. Charles St. Ry. Co., 47 La. Ann. 214, 16 So. 806 (1895). But see Lewis v.
Huie-Hodge Lumber Co., 121 La. 658, 46 So. (1908) (threat by defendant to cease dealing with
firms that sold to plaintiff, a competitor, held justified competition, not actionable tort).
197. Webb v. Drake, 52 La. Ann. 290, 26 So. 791 (1899).
198. Nyland v. United Bhd. of Carpenters Local 1960, 156 La. 604, 100 So. 733 (1924).
199. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. v. Firemen's Fund Fire Ins. Co. 97 Miss. 148, 52 So. 454
(1910).
200. Id. at 163, 52 So. at 456.
201. Id. at 164, 52 So. at 456-57.
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or to threaten to discharge employees for dealing with the plaintiff.202
North Carolina. The attitude of North Carolina toward business boycotts
was much the same. Although it held in State v. Van Pelt20 3 that union boy-
cotts to gain the closed shop were not criminal conspiracies, the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court, besides holding that inducing breach of contract was
actionable,2°4 held that an employers' blacklisting combination was wrong-
fial,20 5 as was a refusal by an employer to deal with anyone who hired an
employee he had fired for joining a union.20 6 Comparable blacklisting by a
union might have been held actionable, the court said, except that in North
Carolina unions were not suable entities.207 In a relatively recent case worthy
of note, the North Carolina Supreme Court granted a recovery in tort when
the defendant, a general contractor, broke its contract with the nonunion
plaintiff-subcontractor in order to induce plaintiff to violate the state's right-to-
work law by yielding to a union's closed shop demand.2
08
South Carolina. South Carolina found employer blacklisting as objec-
tionable as did North Carolina, even without proof of an agreement to black-
list.209 Similarly, a federal district court in South Carolina held tortious a
breach of contract designed by the defendant, a general contractor, to induce
plaintiff-subcontractor to violate the state's right-to-work law.210
Tennessee. Developments here paralleled those in the other confederate
states. Over a powerful dissent by Judge Freeman along prima facie tort lines,
the Tennessee Supreme Court, using "lawful in itself' reasoning, held that the
defendant in Payne v. Western Atlantic .A 211 was absolutely privileged to
discharge employees who dealt with the plaintiff. Thirty years later Judge
202. Wesley v. Native Lumber Co., 97 Miss. 814, 53 So. 346 (1910).
203. 136 N.C. 633, 49 S.E. 177 (1904).
204. Haskins v. Royster, 70 N.C. 601 (1874).
205. Holder v. Cannon Mfg. Co., 135 N.C. 392, 47 S.E. 481 (1904) (prima facie tort approach
adopted).
206. Goins v. Sargent, 196 N.C. 478, 146 S.E. 131 (1929). Van Pelt was distinguished as a
criminal conspiracy case.
207. See Hallman v. Wood, Wire & Metal Lathers' Int'l Union, 219 N.C. 798, 15 S.E.2d 361
(1941).
208. Poole & Kent Corp. v. Thurston & Sons, Inc., 286 N.C. 121, 209 S.E.2d 450 (1974). Actu-
ally the general contractor sued the nonunion subcontractor, the successful counter-claimant, al-
legedly for breaking its (the subcontractor's) contract to complete the job without delay. The
source of the problem was construction-site picketing to force the counterclaiming subcontractor
to accept a closed shop in violation of the right-to-work law. Had the United States Supreme
Court not anomalously held in Retail Clerks Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 196 (1963),
and Local 429, Int'l Bhd. of Electrical Workers v. Farnsworth & Chambers Co., Inc., 353 U.S. 968
(1957), that the states were without power to enjoin strikes, picketing, and boycotts that violated
their right-to-work laws, such litigation as Poole & Kent need never have arisen.
209. Rhodes v. Granby Cotton Mills, 87 S.C. 18, 68 S.E. 824 (1910).
210. Gregory Elec. Co. v. Custodis Constr. Co., 312 F. Supp. 300 (D.S.C. 1970).
211. 81 Tenn. 507 (1884).
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Freeman's dissent became the majority view. Hutton v. Watters2 12 expressly
overruled the Payne decision and found it actionable for school authorities to
threaten the expulsion of students who boarded with the plaintiff, when the
only motive was the refusal of the plaintiff to eject a boarder when requested
to do so by the president of the school.2 13 Tennessee was also as hard on the
boycotting activities of business cartels, 214 and on employer-union combina-
tions to oust competitive businesses, 215 as were the other southern states.
Texas. Long the South's most commercially and industrially developed
state, as well as its largest, Texas was in the forefront in its legal development
as well. In the area of business boycotts the Texas courts relatively early took
a stance compatible with the prima facie tort principle. In Delz v. Winfree,
2 16
a much-cited case, the Texas Supreme Court ruled that a genuinely primary
act, such as a refusal to deal on unsatisfactory terms, was privileged, but that if
a combination should put pressure on third parties to refuse to sell to or buy
from the plaintiff, some ground ofjustification would have to be established or
the boycott would be held actionable.21 7 On the other hand, if a defendant
was concerned only in removing the plaintiff's unfair competition when it
complained to the plaintiffs employer about his conduct, the defendant would
not be liable even though plaintiff was discharged as an unintended conse-
quence of the complaint.2 18 So too, a medical society2 19 and an association of
212. 132 Tenn. 527, 179 S.W. 134 (1915).
213. Id. at 540, 179 S.W. at 137.
214. Eg., Bailey v. Master Plumbers, 103 Tenn. 99, 52 S.W. 853 (1899) (expressing a powerful
antimonopoly, procompetition sentiment).
215. Lichter v. Fulcher, 22 Tenn. App. 670, 125 S.W.2d 501 (1939) (plaintiff allowed punitive
as well as compensatory damages against the defendant, a contractors' association, which had
combined with a labor organization to eliminate plaintiff's competition by denying him access to
workers). Indicating a similar commitment to free competition, the Tennessee Supreme Court
struck down a Nashville ordinance requiring the union label on all city printing. Marshall v. City
of Nashville, 109 Tenn. 495, 71 S.W. 815 (1903).
216. 80 Tex. 400, 16 S.W. 111 (1891).
217. Id. at 405, 16 S.W. at 112. See also Halley v. Brooks, 191 S.W. 781 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916)
(ban by school authorities on patronizing plaintiff's store held actionable when no socially service-
able justification advanced); Olive v. Van Patten, 7 Tex. Civ. App. 630,25 S.W. 428 (1894) (secon-
dary boycotting of lumber dealer who refused to join wholesalers' cartel held actionable);
International & G.N. R.R. v. Greenwood, 2 Tex. Civ. App. 76, 21 S.W. 559 (1893) (threats to
discharge and discharge of employees who boarded with plaintiff held actionable in absence of
just cause, but refusals to hire held privileged and judgment for plaintiff reversed on damages
grounds).
218. Swift & Co. v. Allen, 151 S.W. 645 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912) (an extremely instructive case
on the essentially teleological, hence "subjective" character of all legal doctrine). See also Robi-
son v. Texas Pine Land Ass'n, Tex. Civ. App. 40 S.W. 843 (1897) (threats to discharge employees
who patronized plaintiff's competing store held justified competition); Donavan v. Texas & P.R.
Co., 64 Tex. 519, 521 (1885) (discharge of plaintiff as unintended result of defendant's refusal to
allow plaintiff to enter restricted area held not attributable to defendant, hence not actionable as
against defendant, although court said that "under some circumstances" the discharge might pro-
vide a cause of action against the plaintiff's employer).
219- Harris v. Thomas, 217 S.W. 1068 (Tex. Civ. App.1920) (osteopath excluded from medical
society because of dubious "M.D." degree also excluded from use of defendant-hospital, a com-
mon consequence of the cartel arrangements of the medical profession, resting ultimately on the
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insurance brokers220 were privileged to exclude certain persons from member-
ship, even though the exclusion brought temporal harm, when it was based on
socially justifiable grounds. Finally, in a case suggesting a typical southern
antipathy toward employer blacklisting of employees, a Texas appellate court
saw nothing unconstitutional in a statute requiring employers to give written
reasons for discharges.
22 1
VII. SOME PROVISIONAL CONCLUSIONS AND AN HYPOTHESIS
Since not all relevant features of the southern labor cases have been cov-
ered in this Article, conclusions expressed now must be provisional, pending
review of the remaining features in the second part of this essay. The conclu-
sion at present must be that there was no significant difference in the substan-
tive law applied to labor disputes in the South and North. At least there was
no suggestion of a sterner attitude toward union action in the southern courts
than the prevalent ones in the North. Indeed, we have seen that in several
instances the southern courts tended to follow the "liberal" prounion view of
the New York Court of Appeals rather than the "conservative" view associ-
ated with the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.222
There may have been a tendency among some of the southern courts to
restrict certain types of secondary boycotts more narrowly than the New York
courts did, but these southern restrictions were not as rigorous as those pre-
vailing in the bulk of the northern courts, which tended to be less "liberal"
than the New York Court of Appeals. 223 Moreover, as the section on business
boycotts shows, the southern courts were at least as hard on anticompetitive
business boycotts as they were on union attempts to monopolize labor mar-
kets. 224 Thus, if they were "antiunion" they were "antibusiness" as well-a
fittingly silly conclusion to an ill-founded charge. More seriously, though, the
almost universal common-law acceptance of the closed shop by the southern
courts2 25-prior to the enactment of the right-to-work laws in the late forties
and fifties-should by itself put to rest the notion that judicial "antiunionism"
accounted for the allegedly poor performance of unions in the South.
In the writer's opinion, the general belief that unions have done particu-
control of access to practice of "medicine" derived from state licensure policies; much the same
arrangement prevails in the practice of plumbing).
220. Cline v. Insurance Exchange, 140 Tex. 175, 182-84, 166 S.W.2d 677, 680-81 (1943) (exclu-
sion from membership in defendant-association carried with it exclusion from nonmonopolized
exchange facilities, the court finding that no monopoly was sought or existed in fact).
221. St. Louis S.W. Ry. v. Griffin, 154 S.W. 583 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913), revw'd, 106 Tex. 477, 171
S.W. 703 (1914). See also St. Louis S.W. Ry. v. Hixon, 104 Tex. 267, 137 S.W. 343 (1911) (declin-
ing to pass on the constitutionality of the statute because, contrary to lower court, the Texas
Supreme Court found no violation), rev'g 126 S.W. 338 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910).
222. See sections III, IV, and V D supra.
223. See notes 111-16, 121-22 and accompanying text supra.
224. See section VI supra. This suggests that the courts were more anti-monopoly-minded
than they were antiunion or antibusiness.
225. See section III supra.
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larly badly in the South is as wide of the mark as is the question-begging belief
that they have done poorly for "institutional" reasons, it is true that the pro-
portion of union membership to total nonagricultural employment is lower in
the confederate states than the national average. But this is also true of Ari-
zona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Maine, Maryland, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, and Wyoming. In short, nineteen
of the nonconfederate states, like the eleven confederate states, have less than
the national average--thirty states in all.226 Have unions done more poorly
than they should have in all thirty? If so, why?
It is also continually noted that in elections conducted by the NLRB, un-
ions tend to lose more often than they win in the confederate states. But here
too there is a distortion of reality. Indeed, as the latest Annual Report of the
NLRB shows, in 1979 unions were defeated in a greater proportion of elec-
tions in Massachusetts (62 percent) and Vermont (76.9 percent) than they were
in North Carolina (61.8 percent) and in South Carolina (60.4 percent). More-
over, unions lost 57 percent of the elections in Conneticut, 56.6 percent in
Maine, 56 percent in New Jersey, and 59.7 percent in Pennsylvania, one of the
most heavily unionized states in the country.227 It seems that unions are doing
poorly in many states outside the supposedly "reactionary" South. All of the
above northeastern states have impeccably "liberal" reputations, some have
been heavily unionized for a long time, and states such as New Jersey and
Pennsylvania have long been notorious for the power wielded there by local
unions.
I propose the hypothesis that unions originally failed to flourish in the
South for one set of reasons and are doing badly there now for another. There
was not a great deal of unionization in the South in the past, I suggest, for the
same reason that there is little or no unionization in any economically under-
developed area. Unions are strictly secondary and strictly dispensable organi-
zations. There is no basis for labor organization without large capital
investment leading to large employment units. Moreover, there will be little or
no labor organization, even when those conditions exist, unless large numbers
of people believe that there is a natural antagonism between employers and
employees that will result in abuse and exploitation of employees by employ-
ers unless some force intervenes to prevent them from doing so.
As soon as it is widely understood, as it is beginning to be understood
today, that the employer-employee relationship is symbiotic, rather than an-
tagonistic, and that a free labor market will provide wage workers with the
greatest possible compensation for their output, public opinion formerly in
favor of unions undergoes a massive, although largely silent, shift. The work-
ers themselves begin to appreciate that what is good for their employer is good
226. See authorities cited in the notes to Tables 2 & 3 supra.
227. 44 NLRB ANN. REP. 304-05 Table 15 A. (1979).
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for them, and that when the employer faces doom, as the Chrysler Corpora-
tion does now, their prosperity too is threatened. At the same time, the general
public is less prone to tolerate abusive union conduct. Running more or less
concurrently, though often in advance of the foregoing phenomena, business
management develops skills and understanding in personnel relations that
were necessarily lacking in the earlier days of the industrial revolution when
other problems and challenges were more exigent.
An astute corporate executive recently said to me that any firm whose
employees choose union representation is itself mainly responsible for their
choice. His point was that any firm has available to it the knowledge and the
techniques required to win the undivided loyalty of its employees, and to con-
vince them that they are better off dealing directly with their employer, per-
son-to-person, than they would be in dealing through a union. Whether or not
this is true, it is widely believed. All nonunion firms of any size and sophisti-
cation expend considerable effort in "union-proofing" their employees. This is
true North and South, East and West.2 2 8
In the early period when large-scale employment units were particularly
vulnerable to unionization, in part, at least, because their managements could
not, would not, or did not know how to win the loyalty of their employees,
there was not much unionization in the South because there was not much
capital investment and not many large-scale employment units. And now,
when there is greater capital investment in the South, and many more large-
scale employment units, worker opinion and public opinion are no longer in-
fatuated with unions, and corporate managements have learned that winning
the loyalty of their employees is as important to the welfare of the firm as good
products, astute financial management, and creative marketing. Lemuel
Boulware, the noted General Electric executive who tirelessly advocated a
prominent role for employee relations in corporate management, was scorned
and derided in the fifties and sixties when he mounted vast communications
campaigns designed to induce General Electric employees to believe that their
interests were tied more intimately to the fate of their employer than they were
to their unions.229 Today this is the common practice of the many nonunion
firms that keep winning elections, no matter how blatantly the NLRB rigs
them in favor of unions.
230
228. For the predictable union response, i.e., proposed outlawry of management consultants
who allegedly are responsible for effective employer antiunionism, see the statement of Mr. A.
Kistler of the A.F.L.-C.I.O. before the House Labor Subcommittee on Labor-Management Rela-
tions as reported in BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, DAILY LABOR REPORT No. 201 at A16-18
and EI-3 (10/16/79). For a story about one such consultant, see Martin, Labor Nemesis, Wall St.
J., Nov. 19, 1979, at 1, col. 6.
229. For a defense of Mr. Boulware and his policies, see Northrup, The Casefor Boulwarism,
41 HARV. Bus. REv. 86-97 (1963). For Mr. Boulware's own explanation of his beliefs and prac-
tices, see L. BOULWARE, THE TRUTH ABouT BOULWARISM (1969).
230. Having spent a considerable portion of my time over the last 30 years monitoring the
activities of the NLRB, I stand by the accusation in the text. For a few of many documented
studies of blatant antiemployer and prounion bias in NLRB decisions, see S. PETRO, THE KOHLER
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BOYCOTTS IN THE SOUTHERN COURTS
The charge that unions have done badly in the South because the law and
the courts have been against them is part and parcel of the ancient union la-
ment of mistreatment by managements, courts, and society in general. Unions
have never been subjected to unusual legal disabilities, not even in the earliest
days of the criminal conspiracy cases.231 On the contrary, from the very be-
ginning labor combinations were permitted at least as broad a scope of con-
certed action as were business combinations. 232 As soon as courts recognized
a right in unions to engage in picketing, as well as in strikes, it was clear that
unions had acquired greater privileges than were available to anyone else, for
picketing is a coercive secondary-boycott inducement, even though it is not
always recognized as such.233 And then, when unions were held privileged to
engage in conduct everywhere recognized as secondary boycotting in order to
impose closed shops on unwilling employers and employees, the view that un-
ions were being specially favored by the law could no longer be seriously chal-
lenged.
2 34
These facts have not prevented and will not prevent unions and their
sympathizers from complaining of mistreatment by the courts, the legislatures,
the electorate, management, Japanese auto manufacturers, and by everyone
else. We are not entitled to ignore such union complaints, merely because they
are continually made. As long as socially significant charges of mistreatment
are made, it ought to be a function of disinterested scholarship to weigh the
complaints against the facts, so that if they are justified policy-makers will be
encouraged to do something about them, but if unjustified, and especially if
STRIKE (1962); HOW THE NLRB REPEALED TAFT-HARTLEY (1958); Petro, The NLRB versus the
NationalLabor Policy, 1968 ANN. SURVEY OF AM. L. 247 (1969); Petro, Expertise, the NLRB, and
the Constitution, 14 WAYNE L. REV. 1126 (1968); Petro, The NLRB on Lockouts, 3 LAB. L.J. 659,
739 (1952). I would not be at all surprised to find that a genuinely disinterested study of the
disputes between J.P. Stevens and the Textile Workers would turn up considerable evidence of
NLRB bias against the company and in favor of the union, and I hope to do such a study some
day.
231. See Petro, supra note 6.
232. Id.
233. See sections II & IV supra. The contention here is that the universally stern attitude
taken by all courts against business boycotts, if applied even-handedly to trade-union picketing,
whether peaceable or violent, would have resulted m all picketing being actionable, whether "pri-
mary" or "secondary," and whether by employees or by strangers, unless some socially serviceable
ground of justification were established that would justify the deliberate infliction of harm in-
tended by this boycott-inducing activity. Moreover, the general tendency of both courts and legis-
latures to hold or make unlawful purely self-regulating business combinations, if even-handedly
applied to unions, would have made unions themselves unlawful when they began to affiliate, and
strikes also unlawful when they involved the employees of more than one firm. The purpose of
these observations is not to advocate anything other than an appreciation that in holding industry-
wide unions, strikes, and picketing lawful, if peaceable, the courts of this country already had
created special privileges for unions long before Congress did so in such legislation as the Wagner
Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1976). Complaints by unionists and their sympathizers of institutional
anti-unionism are flatly contrary to the facts. The truth is that unions always have been the bene-
ficiaries of special privileges in this country, even in the darkest days of "government by injunc-
tion." These matters are dealt with in detail in the third installment of this essay. See Petro, supra
note 6.
234. See sections III and V B supra; note 233 supra.
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the complaints amount only to demands for greater privilege by persons and
groups already the beneficiaries of special privilege, such demands may en-
counter the opposition necessary to the survival of a free and productive soci-
ety.
